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No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and
love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other.
Ye cannot serve God and mammon.
Matthew 6:24 (King James)
Ethical principles concerning the identification and avoidance of
conflicts of interest have existed since biblical times, and have been
broadly applied to all professionals, representatives, and fiduciaries.'
"Conflict of interest" is a concept that traverses all areas of the law
and affects every lawyer regardless of the nature of his or her practice.
Nonetheless, the legal profession has found precise delineation of the
proscribed conduct to be a difficult task. Canon 6 of the American
Bar Association's old Canons of Professional Ethics2 provided in part:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by ex-
press consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting in-
terests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
The ABA's current Code of Professional Responsibility defines con-
flict of interest in terms of the inherent dilution of a lawyer's loyalty
toward his client.3
Operating under obviously imprecise standards, courts and bar
grievance committees have struggled to define and enforce a conflict
of interest "common law." This task has been complicated because all
substantive areas of law, the myriad attorney working arrangements
(for example, solo practice, law partnership, government entity), and
all stages of legal counseling and litigation create conflict of interest
problems. Within each area of the law and form of legal practice the
1. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959); W. SEAVEY,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 147-151 (1964).
2. The ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS were superseded in 1969 by the
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY [hereinafter cited without cross reference
as ABA CODE].
3. Ethical Consideration 5-1 states:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds
of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences
and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the
desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.
ABA CODE, EC 5-1.
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conflict of interest problems are unique, calling for individualized and
imaginative treatment. There are, however, certain basic ethical prin-
ciples which have guided courts and bar association ethics committees
in determining which situations cause or are likely to cause a dilution
of the loyalty or impairment of the independent judgment of an at-
torney.
The purpose of this article is to indicate situations in which conflict
of interest problems most commonly arise and to suggest principles
for avoiding such situations or resolving unavoidable conflicts. Part
One presents an overview of the subject, with a discussion of general
principles underlying conflict of interest problems. Part Two applies
these general' principles to a number of frequently encountered
problem areas. Throughout the discussion, the author approaches
problem situations with a cautious eye. Not every court or grievance
committee would impose discipline or invalidate a transaction for all
the conflicts scrutinized herein; nevertheless, the possibility of such
measures necessitates extreme care.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
A conflict of interest exists whenever the attorney, or any person
represented by the attorney, has interests adverse in any way to the
advice or course of action which should be available to the present
client. A conflict exists whenever this tension exists-even if the at-
torney eventually takes the course of action most beneficial to the pre-
sent client.
When a conflict or potential conflict of interest arises, a conscien-
tious attorney usually faces three possible courses of action: (1) inform
all interested parties of the present or potential conflict, inform them
of all possible and probable consequences of the conflict should the
attorney continue to represent both parties, and continue dual repre-
sentation with their express, informed consent; (2) after informing the
interested parties of the conflict, withdraw from the representation of
one of the parties; (3) withdraw from the representation of both par-
ties.
If, despite a potential conflict of interest, the attorney continues to
represent the interested parties, the burden will be upon that attorney
to demonstrate that (1) no conflict existed, (2) the voluntary, informed
consent of all affected parties was obtained, or (3) any action in which
809
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the attorney had a personal interest was fair. Sanctions available for
improper representation of conflicting interests include disqualifi-
cation from 4 or injunction against 5 appearing in the matter, discipli-
nary proceedings against the attorney, 6 loss of fee,7 or potential per-
sonal liability for injury to either client.8
Of course, the nature of a particular case or class of cases may cir-
cumscribe both the possible courses of action and the available sanc-
tions for perceived conflicts. For example, if representation of a pro-
spective client would be adverse to the interests of a former client, the
primary if not sole consideration must be the interests of the former
client. The attorney may neither choose which client to represent nor
withdraw from representation of both.9 Likewise, the possible sanc-
tions may be determined by whether the conflict arises in a civil or
criminal case, 10 or whether the conflict results from the conduct of a
single attorney or from representation of conflicting interests by two
members of the same law office."t
A. The Appearance of Impropriety
The admonition that "[a] lawyer should avoid even the appearance
of impropriety" 12 is particularly applicable to potential conflicts of
interest. Fostering public confidence in the impartiality of the legal
system and the integrity of the legal profession requires more of a
lawyer than not being overtly influenced by interests other than those
of his client. Because the appearance of impropriety can be just as
damaging as actual impropriety to public respect for the law and
clients' belief in their attorney's loyalty, attorneys must ensure that
their conduct does not reasonably appear to have been influenced by
conflicting interests. 13
4. E.g., Prichec v. Tecon Corp., 139 So. 2d 712 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
5. E.g., Watson v. Watson, 171 Misc. 175, 11 N.Y.S.2d 537, 539 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
6. E.g., In re Cowdery, 69 Cal. 32, 10 P. 47 (1886).
7. E.g., Hill v. Douglass, 271 So. 2d I (Fla. 1972) (attorney allowed to recover
fee for services rendered prior to the time conflict arose, but not afterward).
8. E.g., Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966).
9. See Part 11 infra.
10. See Part 1I-B-4 infra.
11. See Part I-Finfra.
12. ABA CODE, Canon 9.
13. See EC 9-1, EC 9-2. EC 9-2 states: "When explicit ethical guidance does
not exist, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the legal system and the legal pro-
fession."
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The boundary between ethical and unethical behavior is often not
clearly delineated; avoidance of the appearance of professional impro-
priety is, therefore, at the heart of many ethics decisions involving con-
flicts of interest. 14 Thus, "[i] t has been suggested that a good rule of
thumb is 'When in doubt, don't.' "15
B. Dilution of Loyalty to Client
The potential variety of interests which might dilute a lawyer's loy-
alty to his clients is limitless. They include the attorney's personal in-
terests (financial security, prestige, and self-esteem) and the interests
of third persons (family, friends, business associates, employer, the
legal profession, and society as a whole).
The representation of more than one party to a transaction often
results in the dilution of loyalty to one or both: buyer and seller, bor-
rower and lender, insurer and insured, consenting mother and
adopting parents, seller and issuer of securities, husband and wife,
multiple personal injury plaintiffs, or multiple criminal defendants. An
attorney's loyalty to a client may also be adversely influenced by loy-
alty to a former client, whether the present representation is related or
unrelated to the former representation. Because the number of often
subtle influences which might dilute or appear to dilute the lawyer's
loyalty to a client is so great, it is essential for an attorney to be aware
of the most common conflict situations, and to be on the lookout for
diluting influences unique to his particular clientele or form of prac-
tice.
C. Confidentiality
The third part of former Canon 6 provided: "The obligation to rep-
resent the client with undivided fidelity and not divulge his secrets or
confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or
employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of
the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed."' 6
14. See, e.g., ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 77 (1932),
No. 220 (1941), No. 278 (1948); NEw YORK STATE BAR Ass'N COMM. ON PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 413 (1975), No. 415 (1975), reprinted in 47 N.Y. ST.
BJ. at 712, 713-14 (1975).
15. WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASS'N LEGAL ETHICS COMM., OPINIONS, No. 161, re-
printed in 29 WASH. ST. B. NEWS at 47 (Oct. 1975).
16. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 6.
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The duty not to disclose confidential communications was more
fully enunciated in 1937 with the addition of Canon 37.17 The princi-
ples of former Canons 6 and 37 are now part of Canon 4 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and its accompanying disciplinary rules
and ethical considerations. Canon 4 states simply: "A lawyer should
preserve the confidences and secrets of a client."
The Canon acknowledges that preserving a client's secrets and
confidences' 8 is as important to him as winning his lawsuit or
avoiding embarrassment or undue expense. Therefore, an attorney
representing a party in a proceeding against a former client will be
deemed to have a conflict of interest if he makes use of confidential
information obtained from the former client.19 In fact, it is sufficient
that there is a substantial relationship between the attorney's former
and his present representation, so that he may or could have obtained
confidential information from his former client useful to his present
client.20 It need not be shown that he did in fact receive such informa-
tion.
This emphasis on preserving a client's confidences also extends
beyond the particular attorney involved. The possibility of even an
unintended leak of such confidences is in large part responsible for the
"vicarious disqualification" of law partners, spouse-attorneys, and
even attorneys sharing office space but not otherwise associated. 21
17. Canon 37 provided in part:
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This duty outlasts
the lawyers' employment, and extends as well to his employees; and neither of
them should accept employment which involves or may involve the disclosure or
use of these confidences, either for the private advantage of the lawyer or his em-
ployees or to the disadvantage of the client, without his knowledge and consent,
and even though there are other available sources of such information. A lawyer
should not continue employment when he discovers that this obligation prevents
the performance of his full duty to his former or to his new client.
See generally ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 250 (1943).
18. Disciplinary Rule 4-101(A) states:
"Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under
applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the professional
relationship that the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of
which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.
ABA CODE, DR 4-101(A).
19. See notes 135-41 and accompanying text infra.
20. See, e.g., Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 548, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1958),
appeal dimissed, 264 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 102 (1959).
21. See Part II-Finfra.
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D. Anticipating Potential Conflicts
Persons involved in disciplining lawyers come to realize that griev-
ances frequently result from simple pitfalls that could have been
avoided.22 The key to preventing unintentional or unwitting violations
lies in anticipating the probability or possibility that a conflict situa-
tion will develop.23 Obtaining agreement of all parties to appearance
by one lawyer on both sides of a question may not be sufficient pro-
tection.24 As stated by Henry Drinker:
The temptation to get into an interesting, important, or profitable case
is always alluring, and the lawyer is very prone to rationalize himself
into the belief that he will be able to steer safely between Scylla and
Charybdis, when sober reflection or a discussion with his partners
would bid him pause.25
The current Disciplinary Rule mandates that a lawyer decline em-
ployment when his independent professional judgment on behalf of
another client will be, or is likely to be, adversely affected.2 6 Thus, if
the intensity of a lawyer's personal feeling27 or a perceived duty to the
public or profession 28 might impair the effective representation of a
prospective client, he must decline employment at the outset.
Several specific potential conflict situations are best avoided alto-
gether. If a lawyer or a member of his firm ought to be called as a wit-
ness in contemplated or pending litigation, he should not accept
employment "unless circumstances arise which could not be anticipated
and it is necessary to prevent a miscarriage ofjustice. '' 29 Likewise, when
an attorney and a client have separate claims against a defendant, the
22. ABA STANDING COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE AND CENTER FOR PRO-
FESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAWYER: AVOIDING UN-
INTENTIONAL GRIEVANCES 5 (1975).
23. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 104-05 (1953).
24. Id.
25. id. Henry Drinker was chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics
and Grievances from 1944-58.
26. DR 5-105(A) states: "A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the
exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is
likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it
would be likely to involve him in representing differing interests."
27. See EC 2-30.
28. Cf. Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Va. 1959) (court found that
attorney's failure to press client's case for reasons of conscience denied client due
process).
29. Schwartz v. Wenger, 267 Minn. 40, 43-44, 124 N.W.2d 489, 492 (1963). See
DR 5-101(B); EC 5-9; EC 5-10; Code of Trial Conduct: Promulgated by the Amer-
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attorney should not represent the client's interest in an action against
the defendant; the possibility that the defendant might be financially
able to satisfy only one judgment could dilute the attorney's loyalty
toward the client.30 The client's consent to the dual representation will
not alter an attorney's duty,31 nor, apparently, will the possibility that
both suits may not be successful or, if successful, that the defendant
may be able to satisfy both judgments.32 The foreseeable possibility
that a conflict might arise also prohibits a prosecuting attorney who
investigated an automobile accident but decided against criminal
prosecution from representing one of the parties in a subsequent civil
suit. 33 This is so even though state law does not specifically prohibit
him from engaging in private practice. 34
Dual representation is virtually always improper in transactions
such as the sale of property because of the very high probability that
future conflicts of interest will develop:
Even within the limited area of marketable title, a situation may exist
which casts doubt on the advisability of accepting the title. The buy-
er's attorney would be under a duty to request the seller to correct the
situation, whereas the seller might properly contend that the title was
marketable, notwithstanding the buyer's assertion.35
Often, the parties themselves will initiate and readily consent to
joint representation to reduce costs. However, each party may believe
that the attorney represents him exclusively and, once a conflict arises,
may adamantly blame the lawyer. Because the lawyer will probably
ican College of Trial Lawyers, 43 A.B.A.J. 223, 224-25 (1957). As stated by the
Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors:
The great weight of authority in this country holds that the attorney who acts as
counsel and witness, in behalf of his client, in the same cause on a material mat-
ter, not of a merely formal character, and not in an emergency, but having knowl-
edge that he would be required to be a witness in ample time to have secured
other counsel and given up his service in the case, violates a highly important
provision of the Code of Ethics and a rule of professional conduct.
Erwin M. Jennings Co. v. Di Genova, 107 Conn. 491, 499, 141 A. 866, 869 (1928).
30. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 132 (1935).
3 I. ld.
32. If an attorney and client agree to share the recovery pro rata, however, the
attorney's suit would be appropriate. Id.
33. The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics stated: "Canon 6 prohibits rep-
resentation of conflicting interests. Without doing its meaning violence, we can extend
its prohibition beyond cases of actual present conflict to those in which the interests
may with some reasonable degree of probability become conflicting." ABA COMM.
ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 135 (1935).
34. Id.
35. In re Kamp, 40 N.J. 588, 194 A.2d 236, 239-40 (1963).
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have received confidential information from both parties, a subse-
quent conflict will dictate that she withdraw from representation of
both parties. 36 Further, an agreement reached between two parties
represented by the same attorney may be voided if a court subse-
quently decides that the attorney's allegiance was greater towards ei-
ther of the two parties, or that one of the parties was not adequately
informed of the consequences of the agreement. On this basis, courts
have voided pre-nuptial37 and separation3s agreements. The fact that
the parties are on good terms or appear to be in complete agreement
at the time of the transaction does not negate the possibility that fu-
ture disenchantment will develop. 39 A professionally responsible at-
torney avoids such conflicts by refusing to represent even potentially
adverse interests. In addition to avoiding the appearance of impro-
priety, he prevents himself from being tempted to act or convince the
parties to act in a way which avoids the potential conflict but is not in
the best interests of one or both of the parties. 40
II. APPLICATION OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO
RECURRING PROBLEMS
A. Conflicts Resulting from Lawyer's Personal Interest
Disciplinary Rule 5-101(A) provides: "Except with the consent of
his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if
the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be
36. See DR 2-110(B)(2); DR 5-105(B).
37. E.g., Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wn. 2d 293, 494 P.2d 208 (1972).
38. E.g., Schaller v. Schaller, 44 U.S.L.W. 2353 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 20, 1976).
39. This may be particularly true with respect to the elderly. Freeman and Wie-
hofen state:
With age often comes sterner moral feelings against criminal and other improper
behavior and against non-conformity in general. This heightened moral rigidity
may produce a break in relation with members of one's family who do not live by
the same standard. It may also lead to cantankerous reactions when the lawyer
undertakes to give unwelcome advice or crosses the client in any way.
H. FREEMAN & H. WIEHOFEN, CLINICAL LAW TRAINING 465 (1972).
40. See, e.g., Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 448 F.2d 1175, 1179-80 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (per curiam):
Whether facts are discovered and legal positions taken which would create such
a conflict of interest . . . may well be determined by the approach which coun-
sel . . . takes in this case. We think that the objectives of the . . .Act would be
much better served by having an unquestionably independent new counsel in this
particular case.
815
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or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, prop-
erty, or personal interests."'41
Not only is there great temptation for the lawyer to temper his loyalty
to his client where his own financial interest is involved, but the ap-
pearance of impropriety is also great in such cases. For this reason, all
personal financial interests, particularly business dealings between
attorney and client from which the attorney benefits, are very closely
scrutinized for any unfairness on the attorney's part.42 In fact, it has
been said that "[t] here are no transactions respecting which courts
. . .are more jealous and particular, than dealings between attorneys
and their clients, especially where there is great intellectual inequality,
and comparative inexperience on the part of the latter. '43 Therefore,
when an attorney is called into question for entering into a transaction
with his client, the attorney must by affirmative evidence defeat the
presumption of overreaching, undue influence, or fraud arising out of
the fiduciary relationship, or the transaction will be set aside. 44
Under these principles, it has been held improper for an attorney to
enter into an agreement with an elderly client to purchase real estate
in return for his promise to support her for the rest of her life.45 Al-
though the rationale behind the rule would seem to apply equally to
business dealings between attorney and client whether related or unre-
lated to the attorney's employment (a disagreement on an unrelated
financial matter could as easily create a conflict), an attorney's pur-
chase of property which was fair and unrelated to the attorney-client
relationship has been upheld.46 The lawyer must still obtain the cli-
ent's consent after full disclosure, and should any disagreement or
conflict arise concerning the property, he would be required to with-
41. The prior Canon provided: "The lawyer should refrain from any action where-
by for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence re-
posed in him by his client." ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcS No. 11. See also
EC 5-1; EC 5-2; ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 6.
42. See, e.g., Magee v. State Bar, 58 Cal. 2d 423, 374 P.2d 807, 811, 24 Cal. Rptr.
839, 843 (1962); Gerach v. Donnelly, 98 So. 2d 493, 498 (Fla. 1957); Creller v.
Baer, 354 Mich. 408, 93 N.W.2d 259, 261 (1958).
43. Mills v. Mills, 26 Conn. 213, 219 (1857).
44. Magee v. State Bar, 58 Cal. 2d 423, 374 P.2d 807, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1962);
McFail v. Braden, 19 Ill. 2d 108, 166 N.E.2d 46 (1960); Attorney Gen. v. Lane, 259
Mich. 283, 243 N.W. 6 (1932); In re Herr, 22 N.J. 276, 125 A.2d 706, 711 (1956).
45. Eschwig v. State Bar, 1 Cal. 3d 8, 459 P.2d 904, 81 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1969).
46. Palmer v. Arnett, 352 Mich. 22, 88 N.W.2d 445 (1958). See Smoot v. Lund,
13 Utah 2d 168, 369 P.2d 933 (1962).
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draw from all representation of that client's affairs. 47 Therefore, it is
advisable for a lawyer to avoid such business dealings whenever pos-
sible.
It is clearly improper for an attorney to borrow money from a
client, at least where the client is not represented by independent legal
counsel,48 and it is inadvisable, if not improper, to loan money to the
client to further a business venture about which the attorney was con-
sulted.49 Even if the client has not been injured, the appearance of
impropriety inherent in attorney-client business dealings renders it
improper for an attorney representing the trustee of the holders of first
mortgage certificates issued on property in liquidation to purchase
some of the certificates at market value. When some certificates so
purchased later rose in value, the attorney was held to be a construc-
tive trustee of the profits. 50 Because an attorney's ownership of prop-
erty in which his client also has an interest might interfere with the
attorney's exercise of unbiased judgment on behalf of that client,51
some lawyers and firms have established a policy of proscribing the
ownership of equity securities of their corporate clients.52
A presumption of undue influence arises with respect to a will in
which the attorney who drafted the will receives a substantial bequest. 53
The presumption may also be raised by provisions appointing the
lawyer executor or trustee, giving substantial bequests to the lawyer's
relatives,54 or even by an agreement to draw free wills making a be-
quest to the lawyer's church. 55 In those jurisdictions which do not rec-
ognize the rule of partial invalidity in undue influence cases, the at-
torney imperils not only his bequest but all bequests. 56 Ordinary pru-
47. DR 2-110(B)(2); DR 5-104(A).
48. In re Darrow, 39 App. Div. 2d 62, 331 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1972); In re Brown,
262 Or. 171, 493 P.2d 1376, 1379-80 (1972).
49. See Grievance Comm. of Fairfield County Bar v. Nevas, 139 Conn. 660, 96
A.2d 802, 805-06 (1953) (upheld trial court's refusal to order disbarment or suspen-
sion, but stated "the trial court might well have decided that a public reprimand
should be administered to the defendant").
50. In re Bond & Mortgage Guar. Co., 303 N.Y. 423, 103 N.E.2d 721 (1952).
51. See EC 5-3.
52. See, e.g., II R. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM 9-10 (1948).
53. See, e.g., In re Jones, 254 Or. 617, 462 P.2d 680 (1969); State v. Horan, 21
Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488, 491 (1963). This presumption may be difficult to rebut.
E.g., State v. Collentine, 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968).
54. E.g., State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 599, 196 N.W.2d 730 (1972) ($10,000
and powers of distribution in attorney's sister).
55. OPINIONS OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK No. 608, cited in H. DRINKER, supra note 23, at 110 n.24.
56. See, e.g., State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488,492 (1963).
817
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dence dictates that some other lawyer of the testator's own choosing
draft the will to avoid any suspicion of undue influence.57 The neces-
sity of such a course depends on the circumstances: if the lawyer
might reasonably be accused of using undue influence, the provision
should be drawn by another lawyer.5 8 On the other hand, when the
testator originates the suggestion, is entirely competent, and has had a
long-standing relationship with the lawyer, a reasonable legacy can be
given to the drafting lawyer with no necessity of having another
lawyer in the case.5 9 At least one court has held, however, that the
drafting of the will by one who functioned merely as a "scrivener" for
the offending lawyer rather than "as an independent attorney" was
improper. 60
In the event that business dealings with a client are unavoidable,
the lawyer should take all possible precautions to avoid impropriety.
They include obtaining the client's consent after advising him to ob-
tain independent legal advice; informing him of all possible conse-
quences and conflicts that might later develop; ensuring that the roles
of the parties and terms of the agreement are clearly defined and re-
57. "[T] he lawyer should consider having the testator submit the will to another
lawyer prior to its execution." DECISIONS BY THE ABA ETHICS COMMITTEE No. 266,
reprinted in H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 279 app. (1953) (emphasis added). See Magee
v. State Bar, 58 Cal. 2d 423, 374 P.2d 807, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1962); In re Blake, 21
N.J. 50, 120 A.2d 745 (1956).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has drawn a distinction:
We do not mean to state that a lawyer may never draw a will for a personal
friend or members of his family or close relatives in which he or a member of his
family is a beneficiary. A lawyer may draft a will for his wife, his children, or his
parents, or other close relatives, in which he is a beneficiary and stands in the re-
lationship to the testator as one being the natural object of the testator's bounty.
In such a case if the proposed legacy to himself or a member of his family is
reasonable and natural under the circumstances or no more than would be re-
ceived by law and no reasonable grounds in fact exist for the attorney to antici-
pate a contest or for the public to have reasonable cause to lose confidence in the
integrity of the bar, such will may be drawn. . . . However, if the attorney acted
as draftsman of the will and there are any circumstances either because of pref-
erential treatment in relationship to others or if the bequest is more than a token
or modest bequest from a personal friend or the attorney suggested the bequest
to himself or to a member of his family, or any other somewhat persuasive cir-
cumstances, the inference arises and would reasonably lead the public to question
the integrity of the lawyer.
State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488, 492 (1963).
58. H. DRINKER, supra note 23, at 94.
59. Id. Drinker adds that in certain circumstances "it is wise" to have the testator
state to a disinterested witness that the suggestion for the provisions in question orig-
inated with the testator. Id. at 94 n.43.
60. State v. Beaudry, 53 Wis. 2d 148, 191 N.W.2d 842 (1971).
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duced to writing; and submitting the agreement to another, indepen-
dent lawyer for review.61
Generally, improper financial involvement with clients also occurs
when, in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer
acquires a financial interest in the outcome of that litigation. Despite
this prohibition, a reasonable contingent fee is permissible in civil liti-
gation, because it may be the only means by which the indigent or
near-indigent can obtain legal counsel.62 Furthermore, a lawyer may
properly secure collection of fees for services rendered by use of statu-
tory liens against the client's present and future income, which may
include a pending judgment.63 Both the contingent fee and the lien,
then, give the attorney a permissible financial interest in the outcome
of litigation in which he is involved.
There are other, narrowly circumscribed exceptions to the general
proscription against acquiring a financial interest in the outcome of
litigation. Disciplinary Rule 5-103(B) provides:
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or
pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial
assistance to his client, except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee
the expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investiga-
tion, expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and pre-
senting evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable for such
expenses. 64
Although a lawyer may have advanced or guaranteed financial help to
her client with the purest of motives-a desire to assist a client in ser-
ious financial need---such well-intentioned actions create serious eth-
ical problems. A lawyer's financial interest or obligation in her client's
cause limits the exercise of her independent and professional
judgment 65 -for example, when a settlement is offered which might
61. See generally McFail v. Braden, 19 Il1. 2d 108, 117-18, 166 N.E.2d 46, 52
(1960) (adding the requirement that consideration must be adequate).
62. DR 5-103(A)(2). See EC 5-7; EC 2-20; Comment, Providing Legal Services
for the Middle Class in Civil Matters: The Problem, the Duty and a Solution, 26 U.
PITT. L. REV. 811, 829 (1965). See generally F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR
LEGAL SERVICES (1964). See also DR 2-106(C).
63. EC 5-7. See DR 5-103(A)(1).
64. See also EC 5-8.
65. ABA STANDING COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE AND CENTER FOR PROFES-
SIONAL DISCIPLINE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAWYER: AVOIDING UNINTEN-
TIONAL GRIEVANCES 13 (1975).
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take care of her own interest in the verdict but does not advance the
interest of her client to the maximum degree. 66
Although an attorney's personal financial interest in the outcome of
the litigation may be removed when a third party finances the suit,
that arrangement often creates a conflict of interest regarding loyalty
to the client and the third party. "Economic, political, or social pres-
sures by third persons are less likely to impinge upon the independent
judgment of a lawyer in a matter in which he is compensated directly
by his client and his professional work is exclusively with his client." 67
The responsibility the lawyer naturally feels towards the person fi-
nancing the litigation mandates, as a minimum, full disclosure of the
conflict to the client.6 8 In some instances, the potential for or appear-
ance of dilution of loyalty to the client is so great that a third-party
arrangement is proscribed altogether. For example, an attorney may
not obtain trust business for his trust company employer by drafting
documents free of charge naming the trust company as executor or
trustee.69 The appearance of impropriety exists even where the at-
torney is not retained but only recommended by the trust company,
and the subsequent appointment of the company as trustee is on the
merits.70 If problems develop and the trust company's client is deemed
not to have had the benefit of independent legal advice, the trust
agreement may have to be reformed. 71 Therefore, the trust company
should be advised that when asked to recommend an attorney, it
should submit the names of several lawyers and let the client make the
choice.72
66. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 288 (1954) (advance-
ment of living costs to an injured client or the members of his family found improper
because there is no expectation of reimbursement except out of the verdict).
67. EC 5-22.
68. DR 5-107(A)(l)-(2); EC 2-21. See ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
OPINIONS, No. 320 (1968).
69. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 122 (1934).
70. See H. DRINKER, supra note 23, at 110 ("He will be too disposed to favor the
trust company by naming it as trustee."). See also Hicks & Katz, Tile Practice of Law
by Laymen and Lay Agencies, 41 YALE LJ. 69, 83 (193 1).
71. Jothann v. Irving Trust Co., 151 Misc. 107, 270 N.Y.S. 721 (1934), aff'd, 243
App. Div. 692, 277 N.Y.S. 955 (1935).
72. See Statement, National Conference Group (1951), reprinted in 93 A.B.A.
REP. app. at 25 (1966), cited in L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF
LAW 231 & n.l (1971). The particularly troublesome problems of third-party payment
and conflicts of interest for retained insurance company attorneys representing the
insured under the terms of the client's liability insurance are treated in text accompany-
ing notes 77-95 infra.
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B. Conflicts Resulting from Representation of Adverse Interests in
Same Proceeding
Disciplinary Rule 5-105 provides in part:
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is
likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered em-
ployment, or if it would be likely to involve him in representing dif-
fering interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(C) ... [A] lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that
he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents
to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such
representation on the exercise of his independent professional judg-
ment on behalf of each. 73
"Differing interests" may be "conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or oth-
erwise discordant, 74 but further definition is left by the Code to case-
by-case development.
In an adversary system it is essential that the adversaries have, to as
great a degree as possible, an equal opportunity to promote their in-
terests.7 5 If the interests of two or more parties diverge, it is impossible
(or at least would appear to be impossible) to represent both with
equal zeal.7 6 Any possibility that the attorney will act or refrain from
acting in a way detrimental to the best interests of one or both clients
requires full disclosure to and consent by all concerned. If a court or
ethics committee subsequently determines that the attorney was not
able adequately to represent both parties, his conduct will be deemed
unethical. In all cases, a lawyer should look for guidance to the princi-
ples enunciated above, but an awareness of commonly recurring
problem areas is also helpful in avoiding many subtle conflicts of in-
terest.
73. DR 5-105(B) requires a lawyer to discontinue multiple' employment under
the same conditions as DR 5-105(A).
74. EC 5-14.
75. See Aronson, Professional Responsibility: Education and Enforcement, 51
WASH. L. REV. 273, 303-04 (1976).
76. See generally ABA CODE Canon 7.
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1. Insurer-insured
Liability insurance policies usually contain the following provi-
sions: (1) that the insurer will hold the insured harmless within the
monetary limits of the policy; (2) that the insurer will provide a
lawyer to represent the insured with respect to any claim or action
covered under the policy; and (3) that the insured will cooperate with
the insurer in the defense against such claims or actions. By signing
the insurance contract and subsequently complying with his duty
under the contract to forward any court process to the insurer, the
insured is deemed to have consented to and approved the representa-
tion by the insurer's attorney. 77 Interests of the insurer and the insured
arising out of the insurance contract will be virtually identical when
an action is brought by a third party against the insured for damages
within the policy limits.7 8
Despite this initial unity of interest, however, events occurring at
various stages of the litigation often cause the interests of the insurer
and the insured to differ, if not actually conflict. It is then that the
attorney selected and paid by the insurer but expected to maintain "an
undeviating and single allegiance" to his client (the insured)7 9 is most
likely to act unethically. This divided allegiance is the primary reason
for careful scrutiny of situations involving lay intermediaries. 80 Al-
though the social utility of liability insurance justifies some modifica-
tion of the usual professional standards, "[i] t is incumbent on lawyers
to take account of the difficulties inherent in their dual representation
and to consider the resulting duties. 8 1
a. Settlement offer within policy limits
A common conflict arises when a claimant offers to settle for a sum
77. "If the insured does not desire to avail himself of the company's obligation to
defend the suit including counsel, together with payment of any judgment and costs,
he is at complete liberty to renounce his rights under the insurance contract and em-
ploy independent counsel at his own expense." ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
OPINIONS, No. 282 (1950).
78. Id.
79. American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, Inc., 205 Misc.
1066, 1075, 131 N.Y.S.2d 393. 401 (Sup. Ct. 1954). See DR 5-107(B); ABA CoMm.
ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 320 (1968) ("[A] third party may pay the
cost of legal services so long as control remains in the client and the responsibility of
the lawyer is solely to the client.").
80. See DR 5-107.
81. L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, supra note 72, at 238.
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within the limits of a liability policy. Fearing a possible verdict for a
sum above these limits, the insured urges the acceptance of the offer
regardless of the cost to the insurer. The insurer, on the other hand,
prefers to litigate the claim or hold out for a lower settlement offer.
For example, in one case the insurer rejected the plaintiff's offer to
settle for $5,000-well within the $10,000 policy limit. The attorney
appointed by the insurer to defend the action did not include the in-
sured in the settlement negotiations and did not fully advise him of
settlement offers. The trial resulted in a $45,000 verdict for the plain-
tiff. The insurer was later held liable to the insured for the amount of
the judgment.82 In another case, the attorney, following the insurer's
instructions, rejected plaintiff's offer to settle for $10,000, the
amount of the policy limit. Following a $225;000 verdict for the
plaintiff, the insured sued both the insurer and the attorney. The in-
surer settled, and a verdict for the attorney was reversed following
appeal, the court stating that the attorney had committed malpractice
as a matter of law: "By continuing to act as counsel for the estate,
while entertaining the belief that his primary obligation in the matter
of settlement was to the insurer, defendant violated the legal and eth-
ical concepts which delineated his duties to the estate. 83
In such cases, the insurer quite naturally is not particularly con-
cerned about protecting the insured's interest in avoiding the possi-
bility of a judgment exceeding the policy limits. It is the lawyer's re-
sponsibility to inform the insurer of its duty to the insured and the
likelihood of legal liability should it fail to fulfill that duty. If the
desires of the insurer and insured cannot be reconciled, the lawyer
should withdraw with proper notice.8 4
82. Hamilton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 9 Wn. App. 180, 511 P.2d 1020
(1973), aff'd, 83 Wn. 2d 787, 523 P.2d 193 (1974).
83. Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 416 (1968). See
National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co. v. O'Daniel, 329 F.2d 60 (9th Cir. 1964);
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Henderson, 82 Ariz. 335, 313 P.2d 404 (1957); Olitkowski v.
St. Casimir's Say. & Loan Ass'n, 302 Mich. 303, 4 N.W.2d 664, 668 (1942). See also
Brodsky, Duty of Attorney Appointed by Liability Insurance Company, 14 CLEV.-MAR.
L. REV. 375, 385 (1965); Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settle-
ment, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1136 (1954).
84. See Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 413 (1968);
DR 2-110(B)(2); DR 2-110(C)(1)(c), (e); H. DRINKER, supra note 23, at 115 n.16.
It has been suggested that the parties may avoid this problem by creating a relationship
under which the attorney has a duty to the insured only with respect to trial defense
and not during settlement. Keeton, supra note 83, at 1167-71. "It is essential in such
a case, however, that the parties clearly understand that the client-attorney relation-
823
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b. Failure to cooperate
When the liability insurance policy provides an attorney to the in-
sured, it also places a duty upon the insured to cooperate in the de-
fense of any suit covered by the policy. In some instances, particularly
suits by a guest against a family-member driver, the insured fails to
cooperate fully in the defense because he desires that his relative ob-
tain a judgment against him to be paid by the insurer. It is most desir-
able to encourage an equitable settlement among all concerned. A suit
by the guest against the family-member owner "should be brought only
after all other methods of direct settlement, or trial of the issue,
[have] been denied by the company." 85 The insured should be re-
minded that he has a duty to cooperate and that his failure to do so
may absolve the insurer of its duty both to defend and to indemnify
him. The insurer should be informed of the possibility that in a subse-
quent action the court may find that there was no legal failure to co-
operate and that the insurer must therefore fully indemnify the in-
sured. Should the conflict be irreconcilable, withdrawal from repre-
sentation of one or both parties is mandated.8 6
Similarly, a lawyer may not defend the insured and at the same
time investigate the failure of the insured to give timely notice of an
accident as required by the insurance policy. 87 Nor may counsel re-
veal to the insurer the insured's confidential disclosure indicating that
ship does not extend to the matter of settlement, and . . . that [the attorney] repre-
sents only the company with respect to settlement." Lysick v. Walcom, 65 Cal. Rptr.
at 415.
85. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 99 (1933).
86. Permission of the court and notice sufficient for the insured to retain new
counsel are necessary prior to withdrawal from representation of the insured. DR 2-
1 I0(A)(1)-(2). See L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, supra note 72, at 240. See also
Thomas v. Douglas, 2 App. Div. 885, 157 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1956) (attorney may not,
at the direction of the insurer, withdraw from representation of insured).
Henry Drinker observed:
[A]fter defending the insured pursuant to the clause in the policy, the same
lawyer may not sue the insured for failing to cooperate as required by the policy.
Irrespective of actual conflict of interest, maintenance of public confidence re-
quires a lawyer not to appear both for and against the same party in the same
controversy.
H. DRINKER, supra note 23, at 115.
87. Employers Cas. Co. v. Tolley, 496 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 1973).
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his earlier version of the accident is untrue,8 8 or that the case is not
covered by the insurance policy.89
Conflict of interest also exists when the policy covers negligently
inflicted harm but not intentionally inflicted harm, and the insured is
sued on a claim alleging both;90 when the policy covers those driving
the insured's car with his consent and the attorney defends a claim-
ant's suit against the insured on the ground that the driver did not
have the insured's consent;91 or when counsel impeaches the insured
on the witness stand for the benefit of the insurer who is not a party to
the suit.92 Professor Pirsig points out that courts, "[w] hile critical of the
attorney's conduct in these several situations ... have not acted with
the vigor and conviction displayed in other conflicting interests situa-
tions evidencing conflicts no more clearcut," adding that" [t] his may be
due to the unrealism of the assumption that the attorney defending an
insured is primarily the attorney for the insured. '93
There is no conflict of interest, on the other hand, when a lawyer
employed by the insurer and prosecuting the company's subrogation
claim against a third party94 simultaneously prosecutes the claim re-
coverable by the insured under a deductible policy, providing the
lawyer does so on a fee basis paid by the insured directly to the lawyer
and not to the insurance company.95
88. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Walker, 382 F.2d 548, 552 (7th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968) ("counsel should have refused to participate further in
view of the conflict of interest").
89. See Guiding Principle VI of the ABA National Conference of Lawyers and
Liability Insurers, reproduced in 20 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 95 (1970), cited in M.
PIRSIG & K. KIRWIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 433 (3d
ed. 1976). See also Schumm v. Long Island Lighting Co., 56 Misc. 2d 913, 290 N.Y.S.2d
423 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (insurance company attorney permitted to withdraw from repre-
sentation of insured upon insurer's asserting disclaimer of coverage).
90. Brasseaux v. Girouard, 214 So. 2d 401 (Ct. of App. 1968).
91. Hammett v. McIntyre, 114 Cal. App. 2d 148, 249 P.2d 885 (1952). See also
Roos, The Obligation to Defend and Some Related Problems, 13 HASTINGS LJ. 206,
211 (1961).
92. Gass v. Carducci, 37 111. App. 2d 181, 185 N.E.2d 285, 290-91 (1962).
93. M. PIRSIG & K. KIRWIN, supra note 89, at 183. But see American Employers
Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, Inc., 205 Misc. 1066, 1075, 131 N.Y.S.2d 393,
401 (Sup. Ct. 1954) ("The Canons of Professional Ethics make it pellucid that there
are not two standards, one applying to counsel privately retained by a client, and the
other to counsel paid by an insurance carrier.").
94. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 282 (1950).
95. Id.
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2. Buyer-seller; borrower-lender; husband-wife; etc.
An obvious conflict exists when an attorney attempts to represent
both buyer and seller, particularly if he has had a long-standing rela-
tionship with one of them.9 6 In such cases, the attorney must not rep-
resent both.97 However, if the parties have already agreed on the basic
terms of the agreement and the attorney acts primarily as a "scriv-
ener," he may normally represent both parties after obtaining their
consentY8 The lawyer should disclose in advance the full significance
of the representation of conflicting interests, including the pitfalls that
may arise in the course of the transaction which might mandate or
make it desirable that one or both parties obtain independent coun-
sel. 99 Both parties must consent to the attorney's possible withdrawal
from representation of one but not both parties. The decision as to
whom the attorney will represent in such an event should be made at
the outset.
The same principles apply to representation of both borrower and
lender. Failure to give adequate advice to either of the parties could
render the lawyer liable in damages' 00 or lead to the lawyer's suspen-
sion.101
It is of the utmost importance that the attorney representing both
parties to a transaction reflect upon the rationales behind conflict of
interest proscriptions. It is not sufficient that the attorney believes
himself able adequately to represent potentially differing interests, or
even that all parties have consented. The possibility of subconsciously
favoring the interests of either party, the appearance of impropriety
that may arise from even the slightest dissatisfaction, the likelihood of
receiving confidential information from one party that is damaging or
96. See, e.g., In re Kamp, 40 N.J. 588, 194 A.2d 236 (1963).
97. See Florida Bar v. Teitelman, 261 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1972).
98. See Blevin v. Mayfield, 189 Cal. App. 2d 649, 11 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1961); Rich-
ards v. Wright, 45 N.M. 538, 119 P.2d 102 (1941).
99. See Craft Builders, Inc. v. Ellis D. Taylor, Inc., 254 A.2d 233 (Del. 1969)
("He represented both buyer and seller so long as their interests coincided, but with-
drew completely when they reached the parting of the ways."). Cf. In re Lanza, 65
N.J. 347, 322 A.2d 445 (1974) (lawyer failed to adequately inform of potential con-
flicts and to withdraw when a dispute arose).
100. Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37 A. 98 (1897) (overlooking prior lien).
101. In re Greenberg, 21 N.J. 213, 121 A.2d 520 (1956) (inadequate disclosure
to unrepresented borrower).
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helpful to the other,102 and the possibility that a court will subse-
quently disagree with the attorney's decision that he was able ade-
quately to represent both interests-all dictate extreme caution in
these situations.
The temptation to represent potentially conflicting interests is par-
ticularly difficult to resist in family disputes. Often the attorney is the
"family lawyer" and has represented husband, wife, and even the chil-
dren on previous occasions. Conflicts may arise, however, if the hus-
band and wife seek a separation or divorce, including property settle-
ment or custody agreements, or if one of the parents desires defense in
a battered child action. 103 The lawyer may see his role as counselor or
negotiator for all concerned. 04 At a minimum, the attorney must en-
sure that each understands the potential conflicts and their conse-
quences, particularly the potential necessity for him to withdraw from
representation of one or both and his inability to use confidences re-
ceived from any of the parties in a subsequent suit between them.
Even a seemingly amicable separation or divorce could later result in
bitter litigation over property settlement or custody. If the parties have
not clearly understood the lawyer's ethical responsibilities ab initio,
the ensuing rancor may be directed toward him.' 05
102. See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 226 Wis. 29, 275 N.W. 910 (1937) (attorney rep-
resenting both the issuer and seller of securities had ethical duty to inform seller that
issuer was converting the funds received from the sale). For analysis of the conflict
of interest problems in the most complex borrower-lender situations, liquidation and
reorganization, see L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, supra note 72, at 240-42.
103. Occasionally, the interests of all concerned may be identical, e.g., where bat-
tering parent can be convinced to seek psychiatric help. But if the interests of mother,
father, and children differ in any way, they must be counseled to obtain independent
legal advice; in the case of children, a guardian or separate representation should be
suggested to the court.
104. See generally Harper & Harper, Lawyers and Marriage Counselling, 1 J.
FAM. L. 73, 79-81 (1961).
105. This is particularly true when one or both parties perceive that the lawyer
has a greater 16yalty to the other party. See, e.g., Staedler v. Staedler, 6 NJ. 380, 78
A.2d 896 (1951) (possible disciplinary action against husband's regular attorney who
managed entire proceedings); Schaller v. Schaller, 44 U.S.L.W. 2353 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Jan. 20, 1976) (separation agreement prepared by wife's attorney voided where con-
sequences not adequately explained to husband who was unrepresented by independent
counsel); Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wn. 2d 293, 303, 494 P.2d 208, 214 (1972)
(antenuptial agreement prepared by husband's attorneys voided because wife did not
"sign the agreement freely and voluntarily on independent advice with full knowledge
of her rights") (emphasis in original).
Partly for this reason, a lawyer for one spouse should not recommend a lawyer for
the other (ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 245 (1942)) or act
for or give legal advice to the other (ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS,
No. 58 (1931)). See DR 7-104(A):
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3. Representing multiple plaintiffs
Conflicts of interest occasionally arise during the representation of
multiple plaintiffs. Because of this potential, 106 each client must have
the opportunity at the outset of the representation "to evaluate his
need for representation free of any potential conflict and to obtain
other counsel if he so desires."' 07 Even where there is consent, if the
clients' interests come into actual conflict during the course of repre-
sentation, the attorney must withdraw from representing at least one
of them.
These principles, along with the importance of avoiding both the
appearance of impropriety and the possible subconscious effects on an
attorney's loyalty to his client, are evident in Jedwabny v. Philadel-
phia Transportation Co.10 8 In that case, the court upheld the granting
of a new trial because of the trial judge's failure to ascertain whether a
plaintiff had full knowledge of his attorney's conflict of interest. Plain-
tiff driver was one of three plaintiffs represented by the same attorney
in a personal injury action. The defendant transportation company
joined the plaintiff driver as a defendant; the jury found the driver
and the transportation company jointly liable. Because the result was
a verdict against the driver in favor of plaintiffs represented by the
same attorney, the court held that it was essential that the judge en-
sure that the driver "had been fully informed and had an intelligent
and complete understanding of his then legal status."'1 9 In dictum, the
majority indicated that because the conflict was inherently adver-
sarial, joint representation might never be justified in this type of situ-
ation.I 0
A dissenter argued that the interests of the driver and the two other
plaintiffs did not conflict because all contended that only the transpor-
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not: . . . (2)
Give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the advice
to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are or have a reasonable possi-
bility of being in conflict with the interests of his client.
106. This is one of the "typically recurring situations involving potentially differ-
ing interests" identified in EC 5-17.
107. EC 5-16.
108. 390Pa. 231, 135 A.2d 252 (1957).
109. 135 A.2d at 254.
110. The court stated:
[M] anifestly, there are instances where the conflicts of interest are so critically
adverse as not to admit of one attorney's representing both sides. Such is the
situation which this record presents. No one could conscionably contend that the
828
Vol. 52: 807, 1977
Conflict of Interest
tation company was at fault."' The dissent reflects several common
misunderstandings in analyzing conflict of interest problems. Because
of the need to maintain public confidence in the legal profession, the
proscription extends beyond merely forbidding clearly conflicting in-
terests; it forbids as well representation which would appear to be in
some way affected by the differing interests. In addition, if there had
been independent representation, the two passengers might have sued
the driver as well as the transportation company. Even assuming full
disclosure and consent to be represented by a single attorney, when
the transportation company joined the driver as co-defendant, it was
no longer feasible for a single lawyer to represent the differing inter-
ests adequately. In Jedwabny, failure to appeal the $10,500 verdict
against the driver unquestionably demonstrated the conflict." 2
4. Representation of multiple criminal defendants
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "[i] n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
• . .to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 1 3 In Glasser
v. United States,"4 violation of conflict of interest principles when
representing multiple criminal defendants reached constitutional di-
mensions. In that case, Glasser and a co-defendant were convicted of
conspiracy to defraud the United States. When the co-defendant dis-
same attorney may represent both the plaintiff and defendant in an adversary
action. Yet that is what is being done in this case.
Id. Similarly, joint representation of plaintiffs, driver and passenger, has also been
proscribed when a counter-claim is interposed against the driver. Weinberg v. Under-
wood, 101 NJ. Super. 448, 244 A.2d 538 (1968). See also Dupont v. Southern Pac.
Co., 366 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 958 (1967) (court may not
compel designation of lead trial counsel to represent consolidated cases of plaintiffs
driver and passenger, because the necessary contention on behalf of the passenger that
if the driver was contributorily negligent the passenger could still recover conflicts
with the lawyer's obligation to the driver to contest allegations of contributory negli-
gence).
111. 135A.2dat256.
112. ld; see THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK COMM. ON PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 109 (1928-29), reprinted in OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEES
ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
AND THE NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION at 52 (Colum. U. Press 1956)
[hereinafter cited as NEw YORK OPINIONS].
113. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The importance of the right to counsel has led to
the requirement of appointed counsel for indigent criminal defendants in both federal
(Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)) and state prosecutions (Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
114. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
829
Washington Law Review
charged his attorney during the trial, the judge asked Glasser's at-
torney to act as counsel for both defendants. Although the co-de-
fendant was amenable, both Glasser and his lawyer expressed reserva-
tions before acceding to the appointment. The Supreme Court held
that Glasser had been denied his sixth amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel. 115 The Court stated that the sixth amendment
right "contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unim-
paired by a court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously
represent conflicting interests. If the right to the assistance of counsel
means less than this, a valued constitutional safeguard is substantially
impaired."1 16
The Glasser holding, that conflicts of interest in the representation
of multiple criminal defendants could violate the sixth amendment,
requires criminal defense attorneys to be particularly aware of poten-
tial conflicts. Several recurring problems in this area warrant separate
treatment.
a. Defendant inculpates co-defendant
In Bruton v. United States,117 the introduction into evidence of a
co-defendant's confession implicating the defendant was held to abridge
the non-confessing defendant's right of cross-examination secured by
the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. This was so even
though the jury was instructed to disregard the confession as inadmis-
sible hearsay with respect to the non-confessing defendant. Con-
versely, in a joint trial where the confessing defendant was subject to
cross-examination, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
the conviction of the non-confessing defendant did not violate Bruton
principles.118
These general principles have implications in the conflict of interest
area when defendants have joint representation. In Baker v. Wain-
wright,119 the prosecution introduced the oral confession of Baker's
co-defendant inculpating himself and Baker in the robbery charged. It
115. Id. at 76.
116. Id. at 70.
117. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
118. James v. United States, 416 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1969). See United States v.
Bujese, 434 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1970); Santoro v. United States, 402 F.2d 920 (9th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849 (1970).
119. 422 F.2d 145 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).
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was to the co-defendant's benefit to take the stand and deny having
made the oral confession. If he had not taken the stand, the trial
would have been void as to Baker because of Bruton. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that although Baker's right to con-
front the witnesses against him was not abridged, the conflict of in-
terest denied him effective assistance of courisel. The court stated:
"When a defense counsel has it within his power to void a proceeding
against his client and, because of his representation of another is not
completely free to exercise this power, he most assuredly has a directly
conflicting interest."'1 20 Because the attorney resolved the conflict by
having the co-defendant testify, Baker was prejudiced.121
A defendant was also held to be entitled to a new trial when his co-
defendant pleaded guilty and implicated the defendant on the stand,
because counsel's duty to cross-examine and impeach the co-de-
fendant interfered with his duty to secure the most lenient sentence
possible for the co-defendant. 22 There was no conflict of interest,
however, when a co-defendant's confession implicating both himself
and the defendant was admitted into evidence, because both pleaded
not guilty and therefore both had an interest in having the confession
excluded or attacked. Hence, joint representation did not deny effec-
tive assistance of counsel. 23
b. Defendant and co-defendant jointly represented at sentencing
In many cases in which the co-defendants' interests and defenses at
trial are identical, the individual treatment accorded them at sen-
tencing might create a desire on the part of defense counsel to argue
that one is less culpable, more contrite, a better rehabilitative risk, or
has a more compelling family situation. In such cases, the attorney
has a conflict of interest, because any such argument necessarily sug-
gests that the other defendant deserves a harsher sentence; both de-
fendants cannot be less culpable. 24
120. Id. at 148 (footnotes omitted).
121. Id. Cf. State v. Martineau, 257 Minn. 334, 101 N.W.2d 410 (1960) (defendant
entitled to new trial where co-defendant who could have exculpated him did not).
See also Morgan v. United States, 396 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1968).
122. People v. Ware, 39 Ill. 2d 66, 233 N.E.2d 421 (1968). See White v. United
States, 396 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1968).
123. Miller v. Cox, 457 F.2d 700 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1007 (1972).
124. See People v. Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765, 447 P.2d 106, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1968)
(dicta) (counsel jointly representing co-defendants on the issue of punishment is
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Where co-defendants both pleaded guilty and received death pen-
alty sentences, one contended on appeal that the joint counsel might
have argued in mitigation of his sentence that his character was some-
what better than that of his co-defendant. Although the court upheld
joint representation, it apparently did so only after noting that the
evidence indicated that the degree of guilt and general character of
the defendants were substantially equal. 125
c. Defendant and co-defendant have inconsistent defenses
Defense counsel is faced with an obvious conflict when her clients
have inconsistent defenses. For example, the defendant was denied
effective assistance of counsel when her attorney did not assert a lack
of responsibility defense warranted by the evidence because of pos-
sible harm to the co-defendant's case. 126 Joint representation was not
found to be improper, however, when one defendant had a "clean"
record but his co-defendant had a criminal record, because the co-
defendant's record would have come into the case in any event. 127 Nor
could a defendant show prejudice due to joint representation in an
action for conspiracy, even though the defenses differed, because each
was involved in a different aspect of the conspiracy; consequently, the
defense of one would not implicate the other.1 28 The possibility (par-
ticularly the appearance) of diluted loyalty is heightened if counsel is
paid by only one co-defendant, 129 or if the co-defendants are husband
and wife.130
necessarily precluded from arguing that one co-defendant is less culpable than the
others, or from showing mitigating circumstances as to one defendant not applicable
to others).
125. State v. Kruchten, 101 Ariz. 186, 417 P.2d 510 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1043 (1967).
126. Austin v. Erickson, 477 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1973). Cf. Sanchez v. Nelson.
446 F.2d 849, 850 (9th Cir. 1971) (lack of inconsistent defenses is not proper test
for determining effective assistance, but whether joint representation deprived either
or both defendants of counsel's undivided loyalty).
127. United States v. Rispo, 470 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1973).
128. United States v. Lovano, 420 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1071
(1970).
129. See People v. Hilton, 26 Mich. App. 274, 182 N.W.2d 29 (1970) (counsel
failed to cross-examine thoroughly a witness who inculpated indigent defendant and
exculpated retained co-defendant, and to object to admission of retained co-defendant's
denial of guilt implicating defendant). But see Mesch v. United States, 407 F.2d 1290
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 826 (1969) (per curiam).
130. In such cases, there is a greater temptation for one spouse to exculpate the
other at his or her own expense. See, e.g., United States v. Pinc, 452 F.2d 507 (5th
Cir. 1971). Cf. United States v. Jones, 436 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1971) (although the
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The multiple criminal defendant cases above indicate that the need
for counsel to disclose fully all potentially conflicting interests to his
clients is greatest in this area.' 31 Once disclosure has been made, the
co-defendants may waive the right to conflict-free representation.132 A
number of jurisdictions have also placed this duty of disclosure upon
the trial court. 33
C. Conflicts Resulting from Representation of Interests Adverse to a
Former Client
In addition to conflicts arising from representation of multiple
clients in the same proceeding, conflicts between the interests of pre-
sent and former clients must also be avoided. Several general princi-
ples offer guidance in determining when such conflicts exist. An at-
torney may not represent the second client if it would (1) require
undoing what he had been retained to do for a former client; (2) in-
volve use or possible use of information confidentially received from a
former client; or (3) create the appearance of impropriety with respect
to his representation of a former client.
The third paragraph of former Canon 6 of the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics provided: "The obligation to represent the client with
undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids
also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from
husband alleged that his defense was hampered for this reason, the court found no
conflict and no denial of effective assistance of counsel).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d 671, 677 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976) (duty of informing criminal co-defendants of potential
dangers of joint representation is initially upon the attorney) (excellent summary of
decisions). See also Larry Buffalo Chief v. South Dakota, 425 F.2d 271 (8th Cir.
1970) (burden of informing court of reasonable possibiliti of conflict of interest is
upon retained counsel, but apparently not upon appointed counsel).
132. See United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Swanson, 509 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1975) (dictum) (co-defendants who were ac-
countants and were warned by both counsel and the court of potential conflict of
interest due to joint representation, but who insisted upon joint counsel, had "requisite
education and training" to make knowing intelligent waiver, despite assertion by one
co-defendant of other's negligence as a defense). Cf. Larry Buffalo Chief v. South
Dakota, 425 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1970) (defendant who retained co-defendant's ap-
pointed counsel does not necessarily waive right to conflict-free counsel where he is
a twenty-five year old, uneducated Indian not expected to understand possibility of
unforeseen conflicts of interest).
133. See United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1972) (prospective applica-
tion of rule for district courts because no prejudice in this case); Campbell v. United
States, 352 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1965). But see United States v. Paz-Sierra, 367 F.2d
930 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 935 (1967).
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others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with
respect to which confidence has been reposed." The possible disclo-
sure of confidences is not, however, the only test of whether represen-
tation of a present client conflicts with the duty of loyalty to a former
client.
Clearly, a lawyer may not seek to overthrow or invalidate his own
work performed for a former client, and the death of the former client
does not release him from this obligation.134 Equally clear is the law-
yer's duty not to represent both adversaries in any part of litigation,
no matter how drawn out. Hence, it was improper for an attorney to
file a divorce action for the plaintiff wife and subsequently to defend
the husband against a contempt citation for failure to comply with the
terms of the order.1 35
An attorney who has prepared a contract on behalf of a corporate
client may not subsequently represent the other party against the cor-
poration in litigation on the contract;1 36 nor may former corporate
counsel defend suits brought by the corporation's receiver against its
customers.137 Because the attorney's duty of loyalty is to the corpora-
tion as an entity and not its officers or directors, 138 change of control
within the corporation will not necessarily remove the bar against sub-
sequently representing conflicting interests, even if there is no evi-
dence that the attorney received confidential information while acting
for the corporation.' 39
The primary test is whether the former and present representation
are "substantially related," so that the attorney could have obtained
confidential information from his former client beneficial to his pre-
sent client.140 For example, in Chugach Electric Association v. United
134. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 64 (1932) (will). See
H. DRINKER, Aupra note 23, at 113.
135. In re Blatt, 42 N.J. 522. 201 A.2d 715 (1964) (court only reprimanded the
attorney because there was no violation of Canon 6, the evidence was inconclusive
regarding Canon 37, there was no showing of the use of confidential information, and
the attorney was a recent admittee). See also In re Maltby. 68 Ariz. 153, 202 P.2d
902 (1949) (reprimand); Florida Bar v. Ethier, 261 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1972) (repri-
mand); In re Themelis, 117 Vt. 19, 83 A.2d 507 (1951) (three-month suspension).
136. Auseon v. Reading Brass Co., 22 Mich. App. 505, 177 N.W.2d 662 (1970).
137. "A lawyer may, however, try cases which are being defended by an insurance
company which he formerly represented, disclosing to his new client his former rela-
tion to the insurance company." H. DRINKER, supra note 23, at I11.
138. EC 5-18. See Part II-E infra.
139. Northeastern Okla. Community Dev. Corp. v. Adams, 510 P.2d 939, 941
(Okla. 1973) (the attorney "carries the burden of avoiding the appearance of evil").
140. See note 20 supra.
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States District Court for the District of Alaska,141 the trustee in bank-
ruptcy for a coal company charged Chugach with violations of the
federal antitrust laws. The trustee's attorney had formerly been the
attorney for Chugach, representing the position of a majority of the
board members. After numerous disputes, a minority gained enough
support to take over control of the corporation, and the attorney re-
signed. Subsequently, the alleged illegal activities occurred. The trial
court refused to disqualify the attorney for the trustee in the suit
against Chugach, because there was no showing that he had had ac-
cess to secrets or confidential information related to issues in the case
during his time as counsel for Chugach. The court of appeals re-
versed, despite the fact that "an actual conflict of interest was not
clearly established."'1 42 The court stated: "A likelihood here exists
which cannot be disregarded that [the attorney's] knowledge of pri-
vate matters gained in confidence would provide him with greater in-
sight and understanding of the significance of subsequent events in an
anti-trust context and offer a promising source of discovery."' 43
Occasionally, the appearance of an attorney on behalf of a party
with interests adverse to a former client on a matter unrelated to his
former representation has been held to be improper. In these cases,
the potential use of confidential information was not a factor. Rather,
courts cited the appearance of impropriety and the possibility that the
lawyer would not take a fully adversarial approach in pressing a claim
against the former client.144 In fact, his sense of loyalty to both might
cause him to choose a course of action which avoids any conflict, but
which is not as beneficial to his present client as it could be.
D. Attorneys Employed by the Government
1. General considerations
The principles relating to representation of interests adverse to a
141. 370 F.2d 441 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 820 (1967).
142. 370 F.2d at 442.
143. Id. at 443. See Motor Mart, Inc. v. Saab Motors, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 156
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) Zplaintiff's attorney disqualified due to representation of defendant
in a similar matter twelve years earlier). Cf. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Independent
Stock Co., 354 F. Supp. 895, 916 (D. Del. 1973) (no substantial relationship found
to exist between two suits in which the attorney had participated).
144. See, e.g., Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 448 F.2d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); In re Kushinsky, 53 NJ. 1, 247 A.2d
665 (1968).
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former client have created unusual problems for government attor-
neys: 145
Unlike the private lawyer, who can identify his duty of loyalty to an
individual client, the government lawyer works for an abstraction, the
identity of which is so diffused that the duty of loyalty is not only hard
to identify, the harm to the government of obtaining a personal benefit
is often difficult to perceive.1 46
Although the Code of Professional Responsibility provides only that
"[a] lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which
he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee,"' 147
the Federal Conflict of Interests Act of 1962148 is more specific. A
lawyer is permanently disqualified with respect to matters in which he
personally and substantially participated, 149 and is disqualified for one
year with respect to any matter which was "under his official responsi-
bility . . . at any time within a period of one year prior to the termi-
nation of such responsibility."' 50
The statute and the Code must be considered together in deter-
mining the necessity for disqualification of a former government at-
torney. In United States v. Standard Oil Co.,15' decided prior to pas-
sage of the statute, the court referred to the general principles of the
Code to determine what constitutes substantial participation. 152 In
denying a government motion to disqualify a former government
lawyer and his firm, the court stated:
[W] here an attorney has worked for a vast agency of the United States
government, as in the instant case, it is hardly reasonable to hold that
an appearance of evil can be found in his undertaking a case against
145. "For the lawyer in government service the representation of conflicting in-
terests has the double condemnation of the principle of law as to public officers as
well as the standards of the profession." L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM. supra note 72,
at 242.
146. Id. at 199.
147. DR 9-101(B). See also EC 9-3. One of the policy justifications for the rule
is to avoid "the manifest possibility that [the lawyer's] action as a public legal official
might be influenced (or be open to the charge that it had been influenced) by the
hope of later being employed privately either to uphold or to upset what he had done."
ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 37 (193 1).
148. 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-218 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (originally enacted as Act
of Oct. 23, 1962, Pub. L. 87-849, § 1, 76 Stat. 1119-25).
149. Id. § 207(a).
150. /i. § 207(b).
151. 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
152. Id. at 353-65 (discussing ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Nos. 6.
36, 37).
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the government where there is not some closer factual relationship
between his former job and the case at hand than that the same vast
agency is involved. 153
Similarly, in two recent cases involving attorneys who had long
since left government service, Control Data Corp. v. International
Business Machines Corp. 54 and General Motors Corp. v. City of New
York,' 55 courts considered the general principles of disqualification
rather than relying upon the federal statute. Even though the statutory
time requirement was met, both courts carefully scrutinized the fac-
tual allegations and attendant circumstances in question to determine
whether there was any possibility of an appearance of impropriety or
of using confidentially obtained information. 56
The rationale used by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in General Motors emphasizes actual knowledge acquired while
working on a particular suit rather than on the supervision of the
office in which it was pursued. The attorney in question had worked in
the Justice Department, investigating among other things an antitrust
suit against General Motors. This investigation led to the filing of a
complaint in 1956 which he signed and in the course of which he
"participated substantially.' 57 Between 1961 and 1963, he headed
the Washington, D.C., office of the antitrust section of the Justice
Department, during which time he was technically responsible for the
153. 136 F. Supp. at 364. The attorney left the Economic Cooperation Admin-
istration and returned to private practice in October, 1951. His law firm was hired in
the spring of 1952 by the oil company to defend against a suit brought by the United
States to recover refunds for overcharges in transactions financed by the ECA during
the time the attorney had worked for the agency. The government contended, unsuc-
cessfully, that there was an appearance of impropriety and an inference of access to
confidential information even though the transactions had involved only the ECA's
Washington office and the attorney had only been involved with its Paris office.
154. 318 F. Supp. 145 (D. Minn. 1970).
155. 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'g 60 F.R.D. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
156. In Control Data, a motion was brought to disqualify the plaintiffs attorney
because he had represented the government in an earlier suit. In denying the motion,
the court relied on the length of time since the attorney left government service (15
years), the different subject matter involved in the cases, change and development
in the industry involved which rendered information gained in the earlier suit obso-
lete and valueless, and the fact that the current allegations were not "investigated or
passed upon" in the earlier case. 318 F. Supp. at 147.
The phrase "investigated or passed upon" of Canon 36 of the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics has been replaced in DR 9-101(B) by the phrase "in which the at-
torney had substantial responsibility." For an argument that the change in wording
does not reflect a substantive change, see In re Biederman, 63 NJ. 396, 307 A.2d
595 (1973).
157. 501 F.2d at 642.
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1956 complaint. The complaint was settled in 1965, and in 1972 the
attorney was hired on a contingent fee basis to prosecute a private
civil antitrust suit against General Motors. The complaint filed was
similar to the 1956 complaint. 158
Denying the motion to disqualify the attorney, the district court
stated: "In determining whether this case involves the same matter as
the 1956 [complaint], the most important consideration is not
whether the two actions rely for their foundation upon the same sec-
tion of the law, but whether the facts necessary to support the two
claims are sufficiently similar."'159 The court then concluded that they
were not.
The court of appeals accepted the district court's test, but found the
two claims to be sufficiently similar in that the same statute was in-
volved and "virtually every overt act of attempted monopolization al-
leged in the city's complaint was lifted in haec verba from [the 1956
complaint] ."160 Interestingly, the court focused on the sixteen-year
period between the complaints, not on the eleven-year period between
the end of the attorney's government employment and the filing of the
complaint. The court ignored his technical supervision over the case
as late as 1962, therefore, and found the impropriety to lie specifically
in the fact that the attorney helped initiate and sign the 1956 com-
plaint sixteen years earlier.
2. Alternative approaches
Recently, three separate groups have addressed the problem of
encouraging government lawyers to bring their expertise to the private
sector (and vice versa) without running afoul of the conflict of interest
rules and without creating the appearance of impropriety. The Amer-
ican Bar Association position was enunciated in Formal Opinion 342
of the Committee on Professional Ethics' 6 ' (hereinafter referred to as
Opinion 342). A second approach to the problem was taken in a re-
cently published Internal Revenue Service advisory committee report.
Finally, an analysis expressly rejecting Opinion 342 appeared in a re-
158. See id. at 652-54.
159. 60 F.R.D. at 402.
160. 501 F.2d at 650 (emphasis in original). Additionally, the court seemed to
give weight to the fact that the attorney was hired, on a contingent fee basis, specifi-
cally for the suit against General Motors. Id.
161. 62 A.B.AJ. 517 (1976) (adopted Nov. 24, 1975).
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cently drafted opinion of the District of Columbia Bar Association
Committee on Legal Ethics. Each of these analyses is discussed sepa-
rately below.
a. Opinion 342
Opinion 342 was written to interpret Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D),
which was amended in 1974 to extend disqualification of an attorney
under any disciplinary rule to all partners in the firm. Prior to the
amendment, the vicarious disqualification rule had not been applied
to disqualifications under Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B), which pro-
vides: "A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in
which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public em-
ployee."
Opinion 342 outlines five policy considerations supporting restric-
tions on former government employees, including "the treachery of
switching sides," the "safeguarding of confidential governmental in-
formation from future use against the government," the "need to dis-
courage government lawyers from handling particular assignments in
such a way as to encourage their own future employment in regard to
those particular matters after leaving government service," and "the
professional benefit derived from avoiding the appearance of evil.' 62
The rationale for extending disqualification to the firm of a former
public employee, according to the ABA, is primarily to prevent cir-
cumvention of the disciplinary rules by the disqualified lawyer. 163
Although the "appearance of professional impropriety" is also a fac-
tor, Opinion 342 contends that it is not the primary test in applying
the revised rule.' 64 Instead, the opinion emphasizes the view that a
special disciplinary rule relating to former government employees
should not broadly limit the lawyer's employment after he leaves gov-
ernment service.' 65
162. Id. at 518.
163. Id. at 520.
164. The Committee observed:
It is obvious ... that the "appearance of professional impropriety" is not a stan-
dard, test, or element embodied in D.R. 9-101(B). D.R. 9-101(B) is located
under Canon 9 because the "appearance of professional impropriety" is a policy
consideration supporting the existence of the disciplinary rule. The appearance
of evil is only one of the underlying considerations, however, and is probably
not the most important reason for the creation and existence of the rule itself.
Id.at 518.
165. The Committee ascribed weight to several considerations:
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To prevent such limitation, the Committee on Professional Ethics
stated that, in applying DR 9-101(B), the phrase "matter in which
[the lawyer] had substantial responsibility while he was a public em-
ployee"1 6 6 would be defined narrowly, to disqualify only where the
employee had a responsibility so strong and compelling that he prob-
ably became involved in the investigative or decisional processes1 67
regarding the same discrete and isolatable transaction between identi-
fiable parties.1 68 The committee also took the position that strict ap-
plication of DR 5-105(D)--disqualification of the firm-to former
public employees disqualified by DR 9-101(B) would frustrate the
policy considerations underlying DR 9-101(B). On balance, the
ability of the government to recruit and the right of litigants to have
trained counsel were held to outweigh prevention of the "appearance
of switching sides" and related policies.
The opinion recognizes two conflict of interest issues to be valid
and to require controls-safeguarding confidential information and
discouraging government lawyers from handling particular assign-
ments in such a way as to encourage their own future employment
after leaving government service. It provides that "so long as the
individual lawyer is held to be disqualified and is screened from any
direct or indirect participation in the matter, the problem of his
switching sides is not present.' 69
In reaching a workable interpretation of the two rules, the ABA
[Ti he ability of the government to recruit young professionals and competent
lawyers should not be interfered with by imposition of harsh restraints upon future
practice nor should too great a sacrifice be demanded of the lawyers willing to
enter government service; the rule serves no worthwhile public interest if it
becomes a mere tool enabling a litigant to improve his prospects by depriving
his opponent of competent counsel; and the rule should not be permitted to
interfere needlessly with the right of litigants to obtain competent counsel of
their own choosing, particularly in specialized areas requiring special technical
training and experience.
Id.
166. DR 9-101(B).
167. According to the opinion:
"[S] ubstantial responsibility" envisages a much closer and more direct relation-
ship than that of a mere perfunctory approval or disapproval of the matter in
question. It contemplates a responsibility requiring the official to become per-
sonally involved to an important, material degree in the investigative or deliber-
ative processes regarding the transactions or facts in question. . . . With a re-
sponsibility so strong and compelling that he probably became involved in the
investigative or decisional processes, a lawyer upon leaving the government
service should not represent another in regard to that matter.
62 A.B.AJ. 517, 520 (1976).
168. Id. at 519.
169. Id. at 521.
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seemed to give primary weight not to the rules themselves, for their
wording clearly imputes disqualification to the entire firm, but to the
policies that form the basis for those rules. The opinion concludes that
Rule 5-105(D) can be avoided if precautions outlined in a two-part
process are taken. First, the firm must develop screening measures to
isolate the disqualified lawyer from the matter in question and from
any fees to be received in connection with that matter. Then the gov-
ernment agency must review the proposed screening measures. If the
agency is satisfied that the individual will be screened effectively from
participation and from fees, and that there is no appearance of signifi-
cant impropriety, the government may waive disqualification of the
firm.'70
However, the opinion closes on an equivocal note:
Although this opinion has dealt explicitly and at length with the inter-
pretation and application of DR 9-101 (B), it is not amiss to point out
that, on the ethical rather than the disciplinary level of professional
responsibility, each lawyer should advise a potential client of any cir-
cumstances that might cause a question to be raised concerning the
propriety of his . . . employment and should also resolve all doubts
against the acceptance of questionable employment. See E.C. 5-105
and E.C. 5-16.171
b. IRS opinion
The Internal Revenue Service, whose employees are a primary
focus of the concerns raised in Opinion 342, issued an opinion recom-
mending revised regulations for former employees and their private
associates practicing before the IRS and the courts. The opinion, the
final report to the chief counsel from his Advisory Committee on
Rules of Professional Conduct, deals not only with attorney ethics,
but also with the conduct of all past employees of the IRS who might
subsequently represent taxpayers. 172
170. The committee decided:
In the event of such a waiver and provided the firm also makes its own inde-
pendent judgment as to the absence of particular circumstances creating a signifi-
cant appearance of impropriety, the result will be that the firm is not in violation
of DR 5-105(D) by accepting or continuing the representation in question.Id.
171. Id.
172. 41 Fed. Reg. 41,106 (1976) (Chief Counsel's Advisory Committee on Rules
of Professional Conduct-Final Report to the Honorable Meade Whittaker, Chief
Counsel).
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The IRS opinion includes an extensive history of the problem and
the attempts of various professions, the Congress, and the IRS to deal
with conflicts of interest. Although it generally follows the view ex-
pressed in Opinion 342 that rigid application of DR 5-105(D) to
former public employees and their associates is too restrictive, its
analysis differs in several respects. The IRS opinion places heavy
emphasis on the appearance of professional impropriety as the basis
for its recommendation to expand the existing IRS rule which pro-
hibits only the official "appearance" of a former IRS employee in a
matter in which he had official responsibility while a government
employee.173
The IRS committee, confronting the issue of disqualification of
associates of former employees, accepted the policy considerations
expressed in Opinion 342 regarding government recruitment and the
right to competent counsel for litigants, but balanced them against the
need to minimize any opportunity for violation of confidences and the
need to preclude employees from handling their government assign-
ments in such a way as to promote future employment. The IRS
committee's solution was to impose three conditions on representation
by a previous employee's firm where the employee would otherwise be
disqualified.
In the view of the IRS committee, a firm may not represent a party
to a transaction in which a firm member participated as a public em-
ployee unless (1) the firm did not initiate the employment discussions
until the employee's government employment was ended or until six
months after the termination of her participation in the transaction
(whichever is earlier); (2) the former government employee did not
initiate employment discussions with the firm while participating in
the transaction (or the employment discussions complied with 18
U.S.C. § 208(b)); 174 and (3) the former government employee is com-
pletely isolated in such a way that she does not assist in the representa-
173. Id. at 41,112-13.
174. According to the IRS committee, § 208
imposes criminal penalties upon a Government employee who continues to act
as such with respect to a matter in which a person with whom he is conducting
employment negotiations has a financial interest. Under subsection (b) of section
208. however, the statute will not be violated if the Government employee re-
ceives a written statement from the appropriate person that the conflict of in-
terest involved is sufficiently minor that the employee's integrity is not likely to
be compromised.
41 Fed. Reg. at 41,112 (footnote omitted).
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tion. This requires statements filed with the IRS Director of Practice
by both the employee and the firm.'7 5 The IRS committee specifically
recognized that compliance with its administrative procedures would
not in any way protect against ethical charges of impropriety within
the profession.
C. District of Columbia opinion
The third recent attempt to provide a wotkable test for disqualifi-
cation appears in an opinion drafted, but not formally adopted, by the
District of Columbia Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics. 76
The chairman of the committee, Monroe H. Freedman, expects this
opinion to be the basis for amendments to the D.C. Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. 77 The opinion (hereinafter referred to as In-
quiry No. 19) takes Opinion 342 to task on several issues, sharply
criticizing the ABA's analysis and weighting of the policies underlying
the disciplinary rules in question. "[A] . . . fundamental . . . error
in Opinion 342 is the way in which it denigrates concern with the
appearance of professional impropriety. . . . There are . . . only
nine Canons, or 'axiomatic norms,' in the Code. One of them, Canon
9, states that 'A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Profes-
sional Impropriety.' "1178 Inquiry No. 19 emphasizes the need, in
meeting the mandate of Canon 9, to view ethics from the eyes of an
unsophisticated public "not wholly trusting of lawyers.' 79
Inquiry No. 19 addresses policy concerns similar to those raised by
the other opinions, but analyzes each more carefully as to whether it
can adequately be resolved by individual disqualification without dis-
qualifying the entire firm:
1. Confidentiality of government information-The D.C. com-
mittee concluded that a government attorney does not have an obliga-
tion of confidentiality to the degree that a private attorney does, be-
cause of the government's duty to deal openly with its citizens. Even
175. 41 Fed. Reg. at 41,117-18.
176. A tentative version of the opinion was published in 3 D.C. BAR REP. 6 (1975).
177. Letter from Monroe H. Freedman, Chairman, D.C. Bar Ethics Committee,
accompanying the Committee's draft opinion in response to Inquiry No. 19 (Dec. 8,
1976). A copy of the draft [hereinafter cited as Draft Copy] is on file with the Wash-
ington Law Review.
178. Draft Copy, supra note 177, at 8-9 (footnote omitted).
179. Id. at 9.
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in cases where there is at least a temporarily legitimate interest in con-
fidentiality (e.g., contract bidding), the real danger is not one of
leaking information to the general public so much as the fear it will be
used to give one private party the advantage over another-the second
area of policy concern.
2. Unfair advantage to one private party over others-Inquiry No.
19 recognizes a valid concern that one private party might obtain ac-
cess to government secrets to the detriment of another private party,
and concludes that even in the absence of actual secrets, the "resulting
appearance of undue advantage to the attorney's private client, is a
significant concern. 180
3. Favoritism to former colleagues-When a former employee's
clients appear to receive preferential treatment from the involved gov-
ernment agency, the appearance of impropriety is "highly undesira-
ble" and difficult to overcome. Even when no favoritism is shown,
inquiry No. 19 concludes that the appearance of favoritism is inevitable
when attorneys are dealing, on behalf of clients, with their former
government employers.
4. Switching sides-The opinion views switching sides as the issue
of widest disagreement between the public and the bar. Notwith-
standing the British tradition of being able to render able legal assist-
ance on either side of a question, the public tends to view lawyers
not only as uncommitted, but as opportunistic, cynical, and even de-
ceitful-prepared to betray yesterday's client for the sake of today's
fee. . . The mere fact of switching from government service to a
private firm is not likely to aggravate that kind of adverse public atti-
tude, but when such a switch involves a lawyer who has had substan-
tial responsibility on the other side of the very same matter, it can be
expected to foster a lessening of regard for lawyers and, thereby, for
the administration of justice."1 81
5. Buying the opposition's best people-The reality or appearance
that a private firm can impair the effectiveness of a government
agency by hiring away one or more key people creates the appearance
that justice can be "significantly affected by money and by the willing-
ness of lawyers to put income above principle."' 182
6. Abuse of government power to further the attorney's career-
180. ld. at 12.
181. id. at 13.
182. Id.
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Employees who anticipate leaving an agency someday are put under
inevitable pressure to impress favorably the private concerns with
which they deal. In addition, there is a temptation to use government
action to obtain discovery or other advantage against a potential de-
fendant in subsequent private action or to institute action to create
subsequent private employment for the attorney.
With respect to these concerns, the D.C. ethics committee con-
cluded that Opinion 342 construes DR 9-101(3) too narrowly to
deal adequately with the real conflicts and appearances that exist. All
of the real conflicts and improper appearances could be eliminated
only by "forbidding acceptance of private employment from any
client or any firm with which the attorney conducted official business
while a government employee."1 83 Although some balance must be
struck, Inquiry No. 19 concludes that the applicable disciplinary rules
themselves represent a balancing of the interests, and that in the face
of all the policy considerations favoring disqualification, DR
9-101(B) should be broadly construed and strictly applied. 184
With respect to vicarious disqualification of an entire firm, Inquiry
No. 19 concludes that two of the ABA's policy concerns--switching
sides and abuse of government power to further the attorney's private
career-are normally dealt with adequately by individual disqualifi-
cation, without disqualifying the entire firm. But other policy con-
cerns are not solved, and may in fact be aggravated by the ABA inter-
pretation and the Opinion 342 procedure. For example, where it ap-
pears that favoritism is being shown to the clients of former colleagues
of agency lawyers or that agency secrets are being used for the benefit
of individual clients, it would be essential to disqualify the firm as well
as the individual attorney, because barring the attorney while his firm
handled the case would leave the appearance of favoritism or unfair
advantage. 185
183. Id. at 15.
184. The Committee reasoned:
[I] f a firm were to ... hire ... key lawyers from an agency in order to cripple
the agency's enforcement efforts, disqualification of the attorney in particular
matters would not be adequate to discourage such conduct. Nothing would
suffice short of absolutely forbidding lawyers to move ... into private employ-
ment. Such a rule would, of course, impose a severe burden on lawyers in gov-
ernment service, and DR 9-101(B) has struck the balance against a complete
prohibition. At the same time, however, the policy considerations enumerated
above remain relevant, and suggest, at least, that DR 9-101(B) should be broadly
construed and strictly applied.
Id. at 15-16 (footnote omitted).
185. Id. at 16-17.
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The D.C. committee pointed out:
ABA Opinion 342 reaches a contrary conclusion by creating an
exception that appears nowhere in the text of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. That is, the partners and associates . . . need not be
disqualified if the former government employee is "insulated" or
"screened" from involvement in the case "to the satisfaction of the
government agency concerned. 1 86
The D.C. opinion registers five specific objections to the screening
process adopted by the ABA, "apart from the violence done to the text
of the Code:' 187
First, screening . . . does not preclude favoritism from being
shown, or appearing to have been shown, to the firm. . . .Second, if
a former government lawyer is inclined to give unfair advantage to a
client of his or her firm by passing . . . secrets, there is no way effec-
tively to police such conduct. . . . [I] n terms of appearance, the evil
remains. Third, screening is irrelevant to. . .hiring away key person-
nel, or to the government lawyer's ingratiating himself or herself with
a potential private employer. . . . [T] hose concerns will not be re-
solved by . . .disqualification in individual cases. They do militate
• . .against weakening DR 9-101(B) by creating exceptions that do
not appear in the text of that section. 188
The fourth objection is that government lawyers called upon to review
the disqualification and screening for the agency are, themselves, "im-
plicated in a serious conflict of interest," since they most likely will
also seek private employment and will want favorable precedents es-
tablishing that their employment will not disqualify the firm from
cases for which they had public responsibility. The final reason fol-
lows directly from that point: " [T] he screening device . . . does not
avoid the appearance of conflict of interest but, indeed, compounds
the conflict and aggravates the appearance of impropriety." 189 The
D.C. opinion and future D.C. disciplinary rules, 190 then, are likely to
186. Id. at 17.
187. Id. at 18 (footnote omitted).
188. Id. at 18-19 (footnotes omitted).
189. Id. at 20 (footnote omitted).
190. Monroe H. Freedman has stated:
The final vote on the draft opinion, requiring disqualification of partners and
associates, was 9 to 7 (with three abstentions) in favor of adopting the opinion.
Under the Committee's rules, however, a majority of the full membership of
the Committee is necessary to adopt an opinion "of broad scope." Since the
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reject the use of a screening device and seem likely to leave unaltered
the "long-established rule that when an individual partner is disquali-
fied, his or her partners and associates must also be disqualified."'191
The D.C. committee has written the better reasoned opinion and
stated the better rule for accomplishing the explicit purposes of DR
9-101(B). 192 The ABA has construed the rule narrowly in its defini-
tions, resulting in the lawyer being disqualified only as to specific
cases in which she had actual (or highly probable) participation. Fur-
ther, even when a lawyer had that degree of personal involvement on
Committee's membership is now 19, we were therefore one vote short ....
However, the Committee has also directed a subcommittee to draft amendments
to the Code of Professional Responsibility regarding the issues involved in the
opinion. The amendments will (1) preserve the disqualification of the individual
lawyer in any matter for which he or she had substantial responsibility while in
government service, and (2) impute the disqualification to that attorney's part-
ners and associates; in addition, the subcommittee will (3) attempt to draft
appropriate standards and procedures for screening the individual lawyer and
thereby waiving the imputed disqualification of partners and associates.
The Committee appears to be unanimously in favor of the first two of those
propositions. With regard to the third-that is, the screening exception-the
vote on the draft opinion indicates that a majority of the Committee (9-7) op-
poses such an exception.
Letter from Monroe H. Freedman, Chairman, D.C. Bar ethics committee (Dec. 8,
1976) (on file with the Washington Law Review).
Dean Freedman goes on to say that two additional votes'will change when the
policy is presented in Code rather than Opinion form, leaving probable final vote at
"1 1-5 in support of a Code amendment which would impute disqualification of part-
ners and associates and provide no exception through a screening device." Id. (em-
phasis omitted). This result is particularly important because of the amount of gov-
ernment-related law that is practiced by the firms subject to the D.C. Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility.
191. Draft Copy, supra note 177, at 21 (footnote omitted).
192. But see Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977). In
Kesselhaut, a law firm represented a client in a matter against a federal agency in
which one of their partners had practiced. The firm, in reliance upon Opinion 342,
established the following screening procedures to avoid vicarious disqualification: the
lawyer in question was allowed to have no connection with the case, none of the
other attorneys was to discuss the case with him, the files were kept in a locked cab-
inet to prevent case documents from reaching him, and the keys to the cabinet.were
controlled by senior partners. The court stated:
We share the view expressed in ... Opinion 342 that an inexorable disqualifi-
cation of an entire firm for the disqualification of a single member or associate,
is entirely too harsh and should be mitigated by appropriate screening as we
now have here, when truly unethical conduct has not taken place and the matter
is merely one of the superficial appearance of evil, which a knowledge of the
facts will dissipate. . . . [T] housands of attorneys employed in the Government
do not ... have Civil Service protection, and are subject to removal .... Per-
sonal disqualifications ...will be extensive in the case of one holding high
supervisory responsibility, like [the attorney in this case]. Should an attorney,
having left Government perhaps contrary to his own volition, ineluctably in-
fect all the members of any firm he joined with all his own personal disqualifica-
tions, he would take on the status of a Typhoid Mary . . ..
555 F.2d at 793.
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the opposite side of a case, his firm may continue representation by
way of an undefined, unregulated, and, according to the D.C. opin-
ion, "unpoliceable" screening procedure. Approval of the conflict is
allocated to government employees who are themselves forced into a
conflict situation. The procedure seems to do little to combat the ap-
pearance of impropriety for a suspicious public, and has little prospect
of curbing the actual existing abuses, which the ABA seemed very hes-
itant to acknowledge.
As in cases not involving government attorneys, there can be no
rigid formula for determining when a former government attorney is
ethically required to refrain from representing interests adverse to the
government in circumstances not covered by statute. 193 Because such
persons bear dual responsibility, both as an attorney and as a former
public official, they should pay special heed to the maxim, "When in
doubt, don't." As a minimum, an attorney should consider filing a
motion in court for an order that his present representation is not
improper in light of his prior government service. 194
E. Representing Corporations, Labor Unions, Tenant Associations,
and Other Entities
Ethical Consideration 5-18 provides:
A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes
his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer,
employee, representative, or other person connected with the entity. In
advising the entity, a lawyer should keep paramount its interests and
his professional judgment should not be influenced by the personal
desires of any person or organization.
When various members of a particular entity come into conflict, it is
often difficult to determine which of the competing interests should be
193. For an excellent analysis of the Federal Conflict of Interests Act of 1962
and its predecessors, see B. MANNING, FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW (1964).
See also Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics, 70 HARV. L. REV. 657 (1957); Perkins, The New Federal Conflict of
Interest Law, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1963). Obviously, the ethical principles con-
cerning conflicts of interest of former federal government attorneys apply equally to
state-employed attorneys. See, e.g., In re Biederman, 63 N.J. 396. 307 A.2d 595
(1973) (interpreting DR 9-101(B)); ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS,
No. 134 (1935).
194. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
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deemed those of the entity for purposes of legal representation. This
problem of identifying the institutional interest involved arises most
often in derivative suits against corporations and unions wherein the
officers are charged with misconduct in the management of the organ-
ization. Regular counsel for the corporation or union initially must
determine whether there is in fact a conflict between his representa-
tion of the officers involved and his duty of loyalty to the organization
as an entity. If there is very little possibility that the plaintiffs will suc-
ceed, it would appear that there would be no conflict between the in-
terests of the entity and the defense of the officers. The attorney was
probably hired to represent the entity by the defendant officers, how-
ever, and his loyalty to those officers would make difficult an un-
biased evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiffs' succeeding on the
merits. Whether facts are discovered and legal positions taken which
would create such a conflict of interest between the organization's po-
sition and the position of the individual officers might well be deter-
mined by the approach which counsel for the organization decides to
take. 95 The interests of the organization in the outcome of the litiga-
tion may be adverse to those of the defendant-officers; the attorney's
familiarity with the facts involved in the litigation might "unfairly tip
the scales against plaintiffs from the outset";1 96 familiarity with the
organization's affairs might make the attorney "a very likely witness if
the proceedings go to trial."' 97 For these reasons, it would be inappro-
priate for an attorney to represent both the organization and its indi-
vidual officers.' 98
In some instances, the attorney will be disqualified from repre-
senting either the organization or its individual officers. For instance,
in Yablonski v. United Mine Workers,199 union members brought an
action under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act200
against the UMWA and three named officers for an accounting of
funds dispersed and for restitution of funds misappropriated and mis-
195. See, e.g., Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 448 F.2d 1175 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (per curiam).
196. Tucker v. Shaw, 378 F.2d 304, 306 (6th Cir. 1967).
197. Id.
198. See Murphy v. Washington Am. League Baseball Club, Inc., 324 F.2d 394,
398 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (quoting Milone v. English, 306 F.2d 814, 817 (D.C. Cir.
1962)); Marco v. Dulles, 169 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Essential Enterprises
Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 182 A.2d 647, 654 (Del. Ch. 1962).
199. 448 F.2d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
200. 29 U.S.C. § 501b (1970).
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spent. Regular UMWA counsel represented the union and the indi-
vidual defendants at the initial stages. When plaintiffs moved to dis-
qualify UMWA counsel for conflict of interest, the firm withdrew as
counsel for the individual defendants in the instant case, although it
continued to represent the union officers in other cases. The firm re-
sisted withdrawal as counsel for UMWA, contending that its with-
drawal from representation of the officers removed any possible con-
flict of interest. The union's need for objective counsel, the possibility
of future conflicts of interest, and the appearance of conflict of in-
terest were primary concerns of the court in requiring the firm's with-
drawal.20'
Although problems in determining the "institutional interest" of an
entity most commonly arise in the context of corporate or union de-
rivative suits, such problems are not limited to any particular type of
entity or litigation. Whenever a lawyer represents an entity comprising
individuals with conflicting or potentially conflicting interests, she
must carefully determine the interests of the entity as a whole and
withstand the influence of particular individuals. For example, a legal
aid society which has agreed to represent a local tenants' association
must represent the association's interests and not those of the officers
alone. What if the officers want to withhold rent and refuse to permit
a vote of the entire membership on the issue? Should the attorneys
help? Require a vote before helping? Do the attorneys have the right
(or duty) to require democratic governance of the association? Is this
so even if the officers appear to have the best understanding of the
needs of the group as a whole?
Similar problems confront the lawyer for a large state university.
Does the lawyer represent the president, the board of regents, the stu-
dent body, or the state taxpayers? If conflicts develop among these
groups, is there an automatic duty to represent a particular segment,
or may the lawyer choose those whom he believes to be acting in the
best interests of the university as an entity?
201. 448 F.2d at 1179-80. The court also noted that independent counsel could
better evaluate the union's interest. Id. at 1181. Similarly, the identification of the
institutional interest and the importance of appearing to represent only the entity
were reasons for the ABA to hold it "improper for an attorney who is general counsel
for a corporation to solicit proxies from, or to act as proxy for, stockholders in a
contested election of directors." ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS,
No. 86 (1932). See generally Note, Independent Representation for Corporate De-
fendants in Derivative Suits, 74 YALE L. J. 524 (1965).
850
Vol. 52: 807, 1977
Conflict of Interest
In most cases, answers to these questions would require careful
evaluation of the particular circumstances involved. Nonetheless, the
questions reveal how important it is that an attorney for such an entity
not identify too closely with any one individual or group, and that he
ensure that groups whose interests he chooses not to represent are
made aware of his position and the need for independent legal repre-
sentation.
F. Vicarious Disqualification
Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) provides: "If a lawyer is required to
decline employment or to withdraw from employment under a Disci-
plinary Rule, no partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated
with him or his firm, may accept or continue such employmemt."20.2
This rule of vicarious disqualification is a particular example of the
need to avoid influences unrelated to the representation of a client
which might tend to dilute the lawyer's loyalty to that client. All of the
rationales underlying more general conflict of interest problems are
relevant in this area also. A member of a firm who represents interests
adverse to those of the clients of other firm members could be influ-
enced by a desire not to antagonize the other members or harm the
firm financially. Even if such influences are effectively resisted, the
appearance of impropriety is great.
Of primary importance in this area is the possible use of confiden-
tial information obtained through the firm relationship. "The ev-
eryday interchange of ideas and problems between legal associates
may inadvertently release information which would have been other-
wise kept confidential. 2 03 Although the potential for abuse is greatest
in a law partnership, where all members of the firm are responsible to
the client, vicarious disqualification extends beyond partners. Lawyers
who share office space2 04 and a former law clerk 205 have been dis-
202. See ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 33 (1931), which
states: 'The relations of partners in a law firm are so close that the firm, and all the
members thereof, are barred from accepting any employment that any one member
of the firm is prohibited from taking."
203. Kurbitz v. Kurbitz, 77 Wn. 2d 943, 946, 468 P.2d 673, 676(1970).
204. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 104 (1934). See also
NEW YORK OPINIONS, supra note 112, No. 105: "When attorneys occupy offices to-
gether, they have a mutual relationship of trust and confidence and should aid, rather
than rival each other."
205. H. DRINKER, supra note 23, at 106 & n.38.
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qualified. Similarly, the proscription against serving as both attorney
and witness in the same cause is applicable to an attorney whose
partner is to testify. 206
The rule of vicarious disqualification is not limited to situations
where firm members would otherwise presently represent clients with
adverse interests; an attorney also may not accept litigation against his
partner's past client, even though he was not a partner at the time of
the prior litigation.2 07 "And once a partner is thus vicariously disquali-
fied, the subsequent dissolution of the partnership cannot cure his in-
eligibility to act as counsel in that case. '208 The disqualification at-
taches to any firm which the attorney subsequently joins. Thus, in
Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp.,20 9
a partnership was disqualified from appearing against clients of the
former law firm of one of its partners, despite the lack of any direct
evidence of access to information which could be used against the
company in the present suit.
It is important, however, that the rule not be carried to extremes.
The basis for disqualification disappears when there is little potential
for access to confidential information or when the relationship be-
tween the partnerships involved in the present and former representa-
tion has become sufficiently attenuated. Any possible appearance of
impropriety is then outweighed by the interests in permitting clients to
retain attorneys of their own choosing and in not unduly restricting
the mobility of attorneys between private firms and government ser-
vice or from one firm to another. Several recent cases have recognized
these countervailing interests.
In American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co.,2 10 for example, the court
denied a motion to disqualify a law firm from representing a party
against a former client of one of the associate's former partners. The
court refused to impute the knowledge obtained by the original at-
torney to the present firm: "Carriage of this imputation-on-an-impu-
tation to its logical terminus could lead to extreme results in no way
required to maintain public confidence in the bar."'211
206. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 50 (1931). See Flynn
v. Flynn, 283 1l1. 206, 119 N.E. 304 (1918). But see ABA COMNIM. ON PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 220 (1941).
207. See ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 33 (193 1).
208. Lasky Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1955).
209. 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954).
210. 436 F.2d 1125(5th Cir. 1971).
211. Id. at 1129. See also T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F.
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In a particularly well-reasoned opinion, Judge Weinstein in Silver
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.212 denied a motion
to disqualify plaintiffs attorney who had formerly been a young asso-
ciate in the 80-member law firm which represented the defendant auto
manufacturer. The court considered the attorney's possible personal
exposure to the defendant's confidential information while in the firm,
any reasonable imputation of knowledge, and the appearance of im-
propriety, and held that the attorney would not be irrebuttably pre-
sumed to have knowledge of the confidences of every attorney in the
firm.213
The Silver Chrysler Plymouth decision represents a welcome recog-
nition of the need for flexibility in the application of conflict of in-
terest rules where important public policy interests are involved. It
recognizes the right of clients to representation by attorneys of their
choice, the necessity of avoiding undue restrictions on the mobility of
young attorneys in an increasingly concentrated legal profession, 214
and the trend in large law firms to insulate the various departments
from each other (the "Chinese Wall" solution).215 The court noted:
"Changing times have resulted in continual modification of the practi-
tioner's ethical, social and political rules in our society. . . .Rules
appropriate in guiding lawyers of several decades ago must be applied
in light of current realities. '2 16
Countervailing policy considerations, in addition to those enunci-
Supp. 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
212. 370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
213. 370 F. Supp. at 587. The court stated:
Defendants' proposed rule of an irrebuttable broad presumption would forever
bar any participation in any suits against any interest ever represented by a pre-
vious firm by all partners and associates of a large firm-even students working
for one summer. The size and influence of modem law firms and the number
of huge national and international corporate interests they represent militate
against such a harsh result.
Id. at 588.
214. Id. at 589. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE 1971 LAWYER STATISTICAL
REPORT 10 (1972).
215. Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflict Problems of
Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U.L. REv. 459 (1975). "[T] he techniques of departmental
isolation of inside information-otherwise known as the 'Chinese Wall' or 'Don't tell
your partner' technique-has been widely acclaimed as a practical solution to the
multiservice firms' conflict problems." Id. at 462 (footnote omitted). The Chinese
Wall has also been adopted by "commercial banks that obtain inside information ...
and also maintain trust departments engaged in investment management . Id.
at 462 n.7.
216. 370 F. Supp. at 589. See L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, supra note 72,
at 65-67; Note, Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and
Intra-Firin Cotflicts of Interest, 73 YALE L.J. 1058, 1068-69 (1964).
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ated in American Can Co. and Silver Chrysler Plymouth, include the
unavailability of alternative counsel due to the rural nature of the area
or the limited number of attorneys with expertise in the field, and the
value to the client of the knowledge and expertise gained from a long-
standing relationship of attorney and client. Thus, in a rural commu-
nity where five of the six attorneys willing to handle criminal cases
would normally have been disqualified from criminal defense work,
the rules requiring disqualification were interpreted to be inapplicable
to four of them, at least with respect to the defense of indigent pris-
oners217
Similarly, the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics has acknowl-
edged extenuating circumstances where testimony of partners is con-
cerned. Generally, a lawyer should not accept employment if he then
knows that his partner will necessarily be a witness as to matters not
relating to his professional duties. The lawyer need not necessarily
withdraw, however, if his partner's testimony relates to matters occur-
ring in the course of his professional duties, or if the lawyer's "long
and intimate familiarity with the matter in litigation" makes with-
drawal prejudicial to the client's case.21 8
In Silver Chrysler Plymouth, the court cited the accelerated ten-
dency toward specialization in the bar, and the resulting limitation on
the number of firms with the necessary expertise in highly complex
areas of the law, as creating a need for flexibility in decisions con-
cerning vicarious disqualification for conflicts of interest. 219 The need
for "cross fertilization" of outlook and expertise between the public
and private sectors of the bar220 may indicate a need for flexible limits
on disqualification rules concerning former government attorneys in
private practice. 22'
217. Although the county prosecutor remained disqualified, the judges of the juve-
nile and police courts and the city attorney and his partner were allowed to take the
cases. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 55 (1931).
218. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 220 (1941). But see
id. at 441 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Houghton).
219. 370 F. Supp. at 590 (citing M. MAYER, THE LAWYERS 388 (1967)); Pro-
ceedings of American Law Institute, 41 U.S.L.W. 2627, 2628 (1973) (remarks of P.
A. Wolkin); Note, Unchanging Rules in Changing Tines: The Canons of Ethics and
Intra-Firf Conflicts of Interest, 73 YALE L.J. 1059, 1068 (1964).
220. See, e.g., Brennan, The Responsibilities of the Legal Profession, 54 A.B.A.J.
121 (1968).
221. It has been suggested that this reasoning may have been the basis for the
limits set on disqualification in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), and the Federal Conflict of Interests Act of 1962, 18 U.S.C. §
201-218 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, supra note 72,
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It should be emphasized, however, that none of the countervailing
considerations outweighs clear conflicts of interest (including actual
access to confidential information). Rather, the objection is to the use
of irrebuttable inferences and prophylactic rules. Instead of disqualifi-
cation founded merely upon some relationship indicating the potential
access to confidences, a showing of actual access or virtual identity of
the cases should be required. Further, law firms should be permitted
to rebut any suggestion of access to confidential information or the
appearance of impropriety by demonstrating that attorneys within the
firm are "effectively insulated from exposure to the confidences of
other clients. '222
The need for such an insulating procedure is particularly compel-
ling with respect to multi-service securities firms performing functions
of broker, dealer, market-maker, underwriter, investment banker, in-
vestment manager, and investment adviser, and also with respect to
spouses who practice with private firms or with city and state prosecu-
tors in the same city. Commentators have argued persuasively that the
performance of "functions vital to our capital markets" with respect to
the former,223 and the substantial hardship to married couples caused
by a policy of refusal to hire a lawyer whose spouse works for another
firm or potentially adverse government office in the same city with
respect to the latter,224 require, as a minimum, recognition of the
"Chinese Wall" solution to potential conflicts of interest.
Conflict between the rule of vicarious disqualification and the need
for effective representation of indigent persons by legal aid society
and criminal defender organizations has also created a need for ac-
commodation and innovative solutions. Although the economic in-
terest rationale for disqualification of private law firm members is
absent in such cases, the potential for disclosure of confidential infor-
at 236. But see text accompanying note 192 supra. See generally B. MANNING, FEDERAL
CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW (1964).
222. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581,
588 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). See Lipton & Mazur, supra note 215; Note, Representation of
Differing Interests by Husband and Wife: Appearances of Impropriety and Unavoid-
able Cooflicts of Interests?, 52 DEN. LJ. 735, 752 (1975). But see W. E. Bassett
Co. v. H. C. Cook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821 (D. Conn. 1961) (disqualification ordered
even though plaintiff's attorney conducted the case "at arm's length from his present
partners," there had been no discussion or consultation among them, and the de-
fendant had failed to make timely objection). Arguably, a more stringent rule should
apply to former government attorneys moving into private practice. See notes 184-192
and accompanying text supra.
223. Lipton & Mazur, supra note 215, at 460.
224. See Note, supra note 222.
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mation may be equally acute. For example, in Borden v. Borden,225
the simultaneous representation of two parties to a divorce action by
the same neighborhood legal services office was proscribed despite the
recognized lack of financial conflict of interest: "Lawyers who prac-
tice their profession side-by-side, literally and figuratively, are subject
to subtle influences that may well affect their professional judgment
and loyalty to their clients, even though they are not faced with the
more easily recognized economic conflict of interest. ' '226 And, in ABA
Informal Opinion No. 1233 (1972), the Committee on Professional
Ethics read EC 5-14 and DR 5-105(A) and (B) to discourage, if
not prohibit, representation by a legal services program of both indi-
vidual Native American clients and their tribe, even where no conflict
of interest was presently apparent. The committee concluded that rep-
resentation of the tribe would run afoul of the profession's ethical
standards, because it was conceivable that at some future time the tribe
and the individuals might have divergent interests, that the danger of
exposure or use of confidences of the one against the other by an office
representing both was too great to permit simultaneous representation,
and that the dual representation might also appear improper. 22 7
Borden and Informal Opinion 1233 are technically correct under
vicarious disqualification principles designed to protect paying clients
from subtle conflicts inherent in law partnership working relation-
ships. However, they do not consider adequately the countervailing
interests relevant to indigent parties. To the extent that conflict of in-
terest rules have been designed to protect the client and prevent the
public appearance of impropriety, the rule of vicarious disqualifi-
cation cannot be applied with equal force to legal aid societies.
For wealthy clients, disqualification of an attorney means hiring
another. For indigent clients, however, disqualification of an entire
legal aid or defender organization has far more serious consequences.
If given the choice, most would gladly accept the risk of potentially
divided loyalty. In addition, ethical rules which deny representation to
the poor through vicarious disqualification, despite the consent of all
225. 277 A.2d 89 (D.C. 197 1).
226. Id. at 91.
227. The OEO legal services office had previously represented individual tribe
members when approached by the tribe, which sought counsel in a dispute over
reservation boundaries. The individuals previously represented endorsed the tribe's
position and urged the legal services office to represent the tribe. ABA CoNvNI. ON
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAl OPINIONS, No. 1233 (1972).
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parties concerned, create a greater danger of public disillusionment
than the appearance of impropriety which results from such dual rep-
resentation. 228
Some courts have taken a more flexible approach to vicarious dis-
qualification issues when legal aid representation is involved. In
McGee v. McGee,2 29 the court denied a Neighborhood Legal Services
Program lawyer's motion to withdraw from representation of the de-
fendant in litigation because the plaintiff was also represented by a
legal aid lawyer. The court cited the duty to represent indigents in
need of legal counsel, the lack of any financial conflict, and the fact
that Legal Services lawyers were not associated in a legal partnership
requiring a duty to all clients. In People v. Wilkins,230 a criminal de-
fendant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel due to conflict of in-
terest after the New York City Legal Aid Society had defended him
while representing the complaining witness in .an unrelated criminal
proceeding. Although conceding that the defendant might have pre-
vailed on the conflict of interest allegation had the same lawyer repre-
sented both parties without the defendant's knowledge and consent,
the court refused to apply vicarious disqualification principles to the
Legal Aid Society. In light of the vast number of indigents represented
by the Legal Aid Society and the reduced potential for undue influ-
ence, financial or otherwise, prejudice would not be presumed but
must be demonstrated.23'
McGee and Wilkins represent the better rule that when economic
influence and potential use of confidential information are reduced
and the countervailing need for representation increased, actual preju-
dice must be demonstrated rather than vicarious disqualification pre-
sumed solely from the working relationship. Legal Aid Societies can
thereby avoid actual conflicts by insulating one another from attor-
228. This is true especially when the conflict is as speculative as that involved
in Informal Opinion No. 1233; see note 227 and accompanying text supra. Even in
Borden, where the wife did not consent to the legal aid officer's subsequent representa-
tion of the husband, the court at least should have considered the extent to which it
would permit a "race to the legal aid society" by indigents, in which the loser is denied
representation.
229. 98 Wash. Law Rep. 929 (D.C. Ct. Gen'l Sess. 1970).
230. 28 N.Y.2d 53,268 N.E.2d 756, 320 N.Y.S.2d 8(1971).
231. The court noted: "In view of the nature of the organization and the scope
of its activities, we cannot presume that a complete and full flow of 'client' informa-
tion between staff attorneys exists, in order to impute knowledge to each staff attor-
ney within the office." 268 N.E.2d at 758, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
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neys representing clients with competing or potentially competing in-
terests.
III. CONCLUSION
Attorneys generate numerous complaints resulting in litigation or
grievance committee action because they knowingly or unknowingly
undertake representation of conflicting interests. Most of these com-
plaints can be avoided if attorneys consider and comprehend the var-
ious rationales behind the rules before commencing representation of
a potential client, and withdraw or at least seek guidance if a conflict
arises.
The potential number and manifestations of conflict of interest situ-
ations are limitless. This article merely scratches the surface in an ef-
fort to give some indication of the array of contexts in which these
conflict of interest problems arise. Many other examples could have
been chosen.
For example, if an attorney's representation of two clients in unre-
lated matters requires that he argue for a change in the law that would
be beneficial to one but detrimental to the other, what is his ethical
duty? There is little if any potential for misuse of confidential infor-
mation, but would the tension created cause him to give less than un-
divided loyalty to one or the other? Would the representation appear
to be improper? Would the voluntary and informed consent of both
obviate the need to withdraw?
What about the government attorney who learns about confidential
or semi-confidential procedures not relevant to any one case, but ap-
plicable to all? May the attorney entering private practice make use of
such knowledge to the detriment of his former employer?
Clearly, an attorney for two defendants cannot properly agree to
trade the guilty plea of one in an exchange for a lesser charge for the
other. Is it equally improper for an attorney working in a legal aid or
defender organization and constantly dealing with the same prose-
cutor to plea bargain when steadfast refusal to do so would be benefi-
cial to one client but detrimental to numerous other present and fu-
ture clients, especially if the present client has himself benefited from
his attorney's past willingness to bargain in connection with other
clients?
Entirely satisfactory answers to these and many other questions
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may not exist. However, awareness of these subtle (as well as the ob-
vious) influences should at least result in efforts to adopt procedures
that minimize the possibility of conflicts, and to determine carefully
the most ethical alternative should a conflict unavoidably arise.
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